Critical Heritages (CoHERE): performing and representing identities in Europe

Work Package 1 Work in Progress:

Essay: Heritage and Memory in Europe: a review of key concepts and frameworks for CoHERE

AUTHORS: Christopher Whitehead and Gönül Bozoğlu Newcastle University

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CoHERE explores the ways in which identities in Europe are constructed through heritage representations and performances that connect to ideas of place, history, tradition and belonging. The research identifies existing heritage practices and discourses in Europe. It also identifies means to sustain and transmit European heritages that are likely to contribute to the evolution of inclusive, communitarian identities and counteract disaffection with, and division within, the EU. A number of modes of representation and performance are explored in the project, from cultural policy, museum display, heritage interpretation, school curricula and political discourse to music and dance performances, food and cuisine, rituals and protest.

Work Package 1, Productions and Omissions of European heritage, provides a critical foundation for CoHERE as a whole, interrogating different meanings of heritage, historical constructions and representations of Europe, formative histories for European identities that are neglected or hidden because of political circumstances, and non-official heritage.

This review provides a mapping of the overlapping fields with which CoHERE is concerned, in order to set out some working positions on ‘heritage’ that enable constructive connections with the fields and theories that relate to it, while also articulating relations to practice and to instrumental agendas. Can memory have a collective dimension, and how is this manifest in constructions of ‘European’ memory? What then are its articulations with history, heritage and identity? Finally, this review presents some of the premises of the CoHERE project, including its relation to instrumental agendas and to the prickly definitional questions encountered so far (‘heritage’, ‘memory’ ‘history’, ‘Europe’ etc.) and axiological issues concerning the social and civil purpose of the research.
Critical Heritages (CoHERE): Heritage and Memory in Europe: a review of key concepts and frameworks

Heritage and Memory in Europe: a review of key concepts and frameworks for CoHERE

Christopher Whitehead and Gönül Bozoğlu

One of the peculiarities of European-funded heritage studies projects is that they begin in an explicit context of policy. It can, of course, be argued that little scholarship in the field is totally free of drivers that derive directly or indirectly from policy interests or sensitivity to the markets for scholarship. But EU-funded projects emerge from specific political and sometimes economic motivations that require engagement from researchers, not just at the level of abstractions of the common good, and not just at the level of critiques of practice. And yet, the process of research into European heritages can be dissonant with the assumptions and political desires that seem at first sight to underlie EU funding. For example, a critical view will not reveal the kind of monolithic ‘European heritage’ that might ideally provide the social glue for mass cohesion, a new frame for economic development and a simple means of overcoming social, political and economic crisis. Nevertheless, one of the key challenges for our research is to advance scholarship and take a position that is at once responsive to and critical of political imperatives, as well as being constructive and useful for practice, both in policy making and in heritage work more broadly.

In the scholarly context alone we find a confused and confusing field, or rather an overlapping of fields. Heritage is a slippery concept, infamously hard to pin down in a terminal and universal definition (although there have been many attempts), and hard to extricate completely from other scholarly concepts such as memory, not so much in the psychological sense as in its ‘social’ and ‘collective’ iterations, uses of the past, and – even – history. The dividing lines between these can seem clear to some – especially to those with strong senses of disciplinary belonging or polemic interest – but they are nevertheless contested and ambiguous. Further problems result from uneven flows in communication between scholars in these apparently discrete fields, and also between such scholars and the professionals and non-professionals who work on and with history, heritage, and memory for public, non-specialist benefit.

This review provides a mapping of the overlapping fields with which CoHERE is concerned, in order to set out some working positions on ‘heritage’ that enable constructive connections with the fields and theories that relate to it, while also articulating relations to practice and to instrumental agendas. Some of these matters are generic and have global relevance – how social and collective relations to the past have been theorized, or the usefulness of separate or interrelated articulations of history, memory and heritage. But we are also concerned with the specific setting of Europe. This is itself a mutable concept, a shifting geography and a contested paradigm, contingent on historical processes, successive cultural and political constructions, conflicting representations, and contests of will. And yet it is the subject of a number of theorizations – both in scholarship and policy – that view Europe and its heritage, memory, and sometimes the ‘identity’ that attaches to them, as particular, even when characterized by extramural contacts and appropriations, hybridities and mixing.
We begin with an overview of key themes around memory – can it have a collective dimension, and how is this manifest in constructions of ‘European’ memory? What then are its articulations with history, heritage and identity? This review is intended to explore premises for future research, and not to provide final characterizations of Europe and instruments for overcoming its problems through heritage and memory actions. The former cannot be future-proofed, even if, in the course of the CoHERE project, we will certainly attempt a view from the present that can help in future. The latter – to provide instruments for policy and practice – would be premature at this point in our work, although this is part of the political motivation and expediency of CoHERE. Nor do we intend now to provide a thorough review of all of the literatures that pertain to memory, identity and heritage, which span too many fields for easy compilation in a short paper like this. Here, we concentrate for the most part on certain emblematic strands of literature and debate, primarily from memory and heritage studies. This is a shortcoming to be addressed in future CoHERE publications; another is the need for an integrated account of heritage and memory cultures in Europe that engages not just with scholarship, but also takes policy, regulation and practice seriously, as means through which heritage, memory and identity are theorized. Finally, this review presents some of the premises of the CoHERE project, including its relation to instrumental agendas and to the prickly definitional questions encountered so far (‘heritage’, ‘memory’ ‘history’, ‘Europe’ etc.) and axiological issues concerning the social and civil purpose of the research. Our aim is not to amalgamate or reconcile all of the strands explored, but to build from them some orientations for research into European heritages now.

**Memory and Society**

Maurice Halbwachs used the term ‘collective memory’ in 1925 (although Olick et al suggest that the term was in general use by this point (2011: 16)), drawing on Émile Durkheim’s suggestion that in order to maintain social unity and cohesion, societies need continuity and connection with the past. In his work on traditional religious rituals he argues that they transmitted traditional beliefs, values and norms and all of these shared rituals created a sense of ‘collective effervescence’, where individual identity becomes secondary to a sense of group identity, promoting social unity (Durkheim 1995). Halbwachs too suggests that the collectively imagined past is highly important for the unity of a society. Moreover, he articulates that a shared past is essential to reconstruct social solidarity (Halbwachs [1952] 1992). Halbwachs further developed the Durkheim’s idea of collective memory in relation to rituals. He argued that all individual memory is structured in society (‘social frameworks of memory’) and can only be understood in a group and social context of specific institutions and structures that both produce and are produced by memories. He states that ‘it is in society that people normally acquire their memories. It is also in society that they recall, recognize, and localize their memories’ (Halbwachs [1952] 1992: 38).

Halbwachs distinguishes memory as ‘autobiographical’ and ‘historical’. The former is a memory of a direct experience of an event in the past. This also includes events in our lifetimes that we do not witness directly but that are ‘designated [as] historic’ by groups – Olick et al give as an example the way many of us ‘remember’ 9/11 though we were not at the scene (2011: 19). Historical memory refers to ‘residues of events by virtue of which groups claim a continuous identity through time’ (ibid), such as
North Americans’ ‘memory’ of the Civil War. Commemorations, festive enactment and other representations keep this historical memory alive and can reinforce it (Halbwachs [1952] 1992). For Halbwachs, history is ‘dead’ but historical memory can be ‘dead’ or ‘organic’. We can celebrate something from the past that we did not directly experience so the past can be alive for us, or alive only in historical records (Olick and Robins 1998: x). Additionally, he points out that this difference should not be overemphasized as they merge together (Halbwachs 1980: 59). Paul Connerton (1989), Michael Schudson (1997) and Eviatar Zerubavel (1997) also argue that individual remembering takes place in social contexts and it is socially organized. In an influential passage, Schudson states that ‘in an important sense, there is no such thing as individual memory at all’ because the information about the past that we use in the present is ‘distributed across social institutions and cultural artifacts’ (1997: 346-347), including museums and sites.

Conversely, others emphasize the importance of individual memory. For example, according to Noa Gedi and Yigal Elam (1996: np) ‘collective memory is actually a fabricated version of that same personal memory adjusted to what the individual mind considers, rightly or not, as suitable in a social environment.’ So it creates a perception that people have similar generalized identity, but this is illusory. They proceed: ‘All “collective” terms are problematic – and “collective memory” is no exception – because they are conceived of as having capacities that are in fact actualized only on an individual level, that is, they can only be performed by individuals’ (ibid: np; see also Koselleck 2004: 3; Olick and Robbins 1998: 111; Funkenstein 1989: 6). In any case, whether one begins from the social or from the individual what seems fitting is to think through memory as a dialectical process (Misztal 2003: 54) between actors. For some scholars, this is not a straightforward negotiation. Olick et al (2011) point to the importance of thinking culturally without dropping the term ‘collective’, so as to emphasize that ‘culture is not reducible to what is in people’s heads’ (Olick et al 2011: 19), but rather that collective memory ‘can have a life of its own’, through cultural patterns, or ‘long-term structures [in] what societies remember or commemorate that are stubbornly impervious to the efforts of individuals to escape them’. This aligns in some ways with Sharon Macdonald’s idea of a ‘memory complex’ (specifically a European one, to which we will return) as ‘gaining autonomous meanings, effects and possibilities for ‘going on’ (2013: 4). Both ideas suggest that the extent to which humans can consciously control ‘cultural’ memory is limited. Alongside this perspective, the idea of cultural memory also has value for this research in that it helps to incorporate cultural institutions such as museums into the picture. Olick et al observe that:

Powerful institutions, moreover, clearly support some histories more than others, provide narrative patterns and exemplars of how individuals can and should remember and stimulate public memory in ways and for reasons that have little to do with the individual or aggregate neurological records (2011: 20).

This also helps to illuminate again that the debate is not just about how individuals relate to groups of individuals in memory processes. Some ‘remembering’ is done through institutional representations, as in the case of the museums and official heritage actions that we will study. This institutional remembering needs to be understood as placed within the dialectic between individual and ‘collective’ or
cultural memory, and as one of the means whereby ‘patterns of… symbols’ are objectified publicly in society (Olick 1999: 336), and one of the sources from which people construct meanings for themselves. Indeed, a key idea from current literature – expressed in different permutations – is that individual, collective and cultural forms of memory are mutually constitutive.

Historian Geoffrey Cubitt’s understanding of ‘social memory’ captures a sense of this dynamic and allows a relational understanding of memory in society. For him, ‘social memory’ sits between individual and collective memory, and involves the operation of various ‘cultural devices’ and of elements of institutional or social structure whose effect is often to loosen the connections that given bodies of data may have to specific contexts of individual recollection (2007: 15). It is this ‘loosening’ that allows people to expand the limits of their own experience to include ‘pools of retrospective knowledge’, enabling them to ‘remember’ phenomena that took place long before their lives. He uses examples from Michel-Rolph Trouillot, such as the Quebecois people whose license plates state ‘I remember’ in reference to the French colonial state that predates their lives, similar to Halbwachs’s idea of historical memory. One key issue here is that this sense of continuous remembering can mask ‘radical discontinuities in social consciousness’ (2007: 17). Cubitt does not specify what ‘cultural devices’ can include, but for our purposes they may be institutions such as museums, or national days, TV series, official heritage and tourism productions, and even politicians’ speeches.

At the European institutional level, there has long been official insistence on the collective memory of World War Two and the Holocaust as a foundational story for European identities, as discussed in other publications on the CoHERE Critical Archive (e.g. Whitehead 2017). World War Two assumes value as it affected so many national and non-national parties (in the latter case, the European Jewry, homosexuals, Roma, Sinti, physically and mentally disabled people, and so on), and is for the most part a situation to which there is no will to return, so that the post-war history of Europe is that of a shared endeavour not to repeat the horrors of the past, and as near a transnational moral consensus as can be achieved. As a political project this is unimpeachable, but as argued elsewhere it risks over-determining World War Two (what Klaus Eder calls the ‘Great European Civil War’ (2014: 222)) as the touchstone for European memory and identity, occluding divisions, and occluding other pasts that are critical for European memory, including temporally remote ones, as well as post-World-War-Two events that frustrate the ‘Never Again’ ideal. We also discover that the memory cultures of World War Two are not the same in different places or for different groups, and tensions appear between politics of regret (Olick 2007); denials of culpability where only recently has there been any will (by no means general) to open the records of complicity, collaboration and violence (e.g. in Italy and Norway). A further risk is that of the memory contest, where groups fight for recognition of difficult pasts that have a legacy of disadvantage for them. This is typified by Sandra Kalniete’s 2004 Old Europe, New Europe speech, which sought parity of recognition of the magnitude of Nazi and Soviet oppression.

The reduction of European memory to a post-Holocaust paradigm has been strongly critiqued by numerous scholars (Maier 2002; Levy and Sznaider 2006; Karlssen 2010; Olick 2016; Pakier and Stråth 2012). It forms a core argument in Claus Leggewie’s more complex articulation of European memory culture in seven circles (2010), each
with emblematic content: at the centre, the Holocaust; and then, radiating outwards, Soviet Communism; Expulsion of peoples as pan-European phenomenon; war and wartime memory as ‘motor of Europe’; the ‘black book of colonialism’, ‘Europe as a continent of Immigration’; and ‘Europe’s success story after 1945’. These are not ranged in temporal order but in a kind of socio-psychic seriation. While attentive to dissonant memory contests such as Kalniete’s appeal for the Eastern bloc, this is still an attempt to provide a unified picture of European memory culture, and it is of course subject to the circumstances of its time of writing, before the Refugee Crisis, before the most visible terrorist attacks undertaken on European soil in the name of Islam (or indeed, against it), before Brexit. Do we need ever more circles? Also, what might be the traversals between these layers – their intercommunications and intertextualities?

In his 2009 book *Multidirectional Memory*, Michael Rothberg asks ‘What happens when different histories confront each other in the public sphere? Does the remembrance of one history erase others from view?’ (Rothberg 2009: 2). He takes issue with an understanding of memory as ‘competitive’, or the assertion that the ‘the interaction of different collective memories within [the public] sphere takes the form of a zero-sum struggle for pre-eminence’ (ibid: 3). He goes on to problematize the idea that a ‘direct line’ runs between ‘remembrance of the past and the formation of identity in the present’, so that articulations of the past form part of struggles for recognition ‘in which there can only be winners and losers’ (ibid). Nevertheless, as he articulates in the US context, groups do indeed sometimes see memory contests as a zero-sum struggle, which shapes the ways in which they proceed and reinforces the relations between memory and antagonism.

In the straw-man sense it can seem as though memory is a matter of winning visibility. Which are the pasts that are contenders for the representation of European values and identities? (Again, official instruments like the European Heritage Label do this in practice, as do some curricula, as CoHERE researchers will investigate.) What is their relative visibility and temporal and spatial position? Not all of them are obviously ‘difficult’ like Nazism or ‘Gulag’ – classical antiquity, religion, Enlightenment and exploration are common foundation stories, although their darker sides can be viewed if there is a will. Some pasts are quite obscure, perhaps because geographical and temporal distance seems to reduce their contemporary relevance; because they do not have vocal and powerful champions; or because they take on uncivil associations when they are reworked by interest groups to suit ideology, as elements of the Far Right mobilize the Crusades, or the Siege of Vienna of 1683. We might ask: how are these pasts organized relationally in the public sphere, and what purchase do they have on collective imaginaries. What tensions obtain between attempts to forge singular, ordered and harmonious European memories and other ways of visualizing or perceiving - perhaps patterned views of European memory, or the possibility of a cacophony of memories? What of the silences?

Here, Rothberg offers a useful interactional view of historical memory in a ‘public sphere’ that he calls the ‘malleable discursive space in which groups do not simply articulate established positions but actually come into being through their dialogical interactions with others’ (2009: 5). Multidirectional memory is fundamentally a social theory, because it focuses attention on how historical memory cultures and the groups that invest in them co-constitute one another, even oppositionally or divisively.
Rothberg is interested in ‘uncovering historical relatedness and working through the partial overlaps and conflicting claims that constitute the archives of memory and the terrain of politics’ (2009: 29), and this as an ‘ethical project’ this could be of value in the European context for problematizing not just the European past, but its social meanings and the ways in which they are expressed.

This is helpful as far as it goes, but we ask: how might this be done at the level of practice, transgressing the limited community of interest of academic memory studies to move it into the public sphere of which Rothberg speaks, and into the talk and actions of policy makers and official and non-official heritage and memory actors across society? How might it appear in a museum display, in public reflections on remembering, or in the structuring of policy and community engagements? This is not a straightforward matter and brings more complexities into view: Rothberg deconstructs reductive views of memory, identity and memory contest, but people, groups and institutions often still hold them and act upon them, so to understand memory culture is to seek to grasp the relations between actors’ motivations and worldviews and the wider patternings of memory. Then there is the theory-practice problem: to operate publicly means finding ways to open to audiences of non-scholars the means of, and reasons for, sampling the conflicted ‘archives of memory’ and surveying the ‘terrain of politics’.

What are the archives of European memory? Two perennial problems emerge here. The first is: where does Europe begin and end, how this has changed over time (as much as where is Europe, when is it?), and what we are talking about? Is this: a ‘continent’ or messy archipelago, a rather arbitrary ‘patch of the globe’ (Whitehead 2017); an idea, identity or way of being that can have purchase and uptake outside of Europe’s borders (as with certain secular identities in Asian Turkey or Iran), the EU (which has expanded, but looks at the time of writing likely to shrink); the membership of the Council of Europe (which includes Russia); and so on? The difficulty here is that if we struggle to identify Europe as a stable entity then we will certainly struggle to characterize its memory culture and heritage as unified phenomena. Indeed, it is a common game to consider how different the identities and cultural lives of people across Europe might be, not just across compass points but across ‘memory regions’ in which shared pasts that derive from immediate vicinity might have more collective purchase than a broader European memory. The second perennial problem, connected to the first, is whether Europe has some real social existence, for example in terms of felt sharings, ties and commonalities that cross all European national borders, or whether national or other scales of place (e.g. local regions, cities, international regions such as Scandinavia etc.) are more usual objects of cultural engagement and identification. Klaus Eder argues that because of the structural formation of the EU there is no European demos that belongs to it, and that the existing European society is ‘nothing but the sum of individuals living in ‘sub-European’ (mainly national) groups’ (2014: 219). In a situation of European ‘Crisis’ this often has the effect of mobilizing ‘sentiments of desire for a return to the past of a stable social order’ (ibid: 221) that are more likely to be hitched to national pasts than to transnational ones. As Svetlana Boym argued (2001), such instances of ‘restorative nostalgia’ can be profoundly dangerous, as people may seek to return to a lost home that never was, involving more or less violence towards those who ‘don’t belong’. We ask what part official and non-official heritage plays in this, in providing objects of fetish and solace (the ‘good old days and ways, before x and y and z’) that are
implicated in the production of insular melancholic communities (Gilroy 2004; Wetherell 2012), and what Doreen Massey would have called an ‘introverted sense of place’ (1991, 2004).

One alternative to the idea of a unified memory include the notion that there is a common way of ‘doing the past’ in Europe, even if people’s attachments to the past and what place or group they identify with may differ. In perhaps the best-known and most recent articulation of this, in Sharon Macdonald articulates this as a ‘European memory complex’, subsuming questions of heritage and identity, a ‘distinctive – though not exclusive or all-encompassing – complex of ways of doing and experiencing the past within Europe’ (2012: 2), subject to change (not a ‘blueprint’), including contradictions and contentions, and capable of ‘going on’ somewhat autonomously, a sense that it might slip from direct human control and act unpredictably (2012: 5). This complex presents in forms of memory at myriad sites: from street food, cuisine and people’s life stories to official commemorations, museums and authorized heritage. The contention is that across all of these, some kind of mobile pattern can be glimpsed, that is a ‘distinctive’ deposit of a European history marked by diversity and encounters with difference. The caveats are that this ‘complex’ is not exclusive, and memory actions that look practically identical to those that are thought of as European might happen elsewhere (this alone would not make them ‘European’, as if they were simple appropriations or instantiations of Europe outside Europe); and that it is not ‘all-encompassing’, so that people can do things, and things might happen, that do not ‘fit’. In this sense, the memory complex, although compelling as a (moving) image and a way of seeing, is hard to pin down; its expanse and unspecified nature might be accurate to European memory practice, but this means that it can be difficult to use analytically.

Comparably, what could emerge as a proxy for a ‘unified’ memory is a specific history of ‘entanglement’ of cultures in and outwith Europe: that the cultures of Europe are indeed ‘not separated’ but ‘have been shaped in close interaction with each other and the non-European world’ (Delanty 2017, forthcoming, np.). In CoHERE, inspired by global history approaches and by the kind of relational geography articulated by figures such as Doreen Massey (1991, 2004) and Margaret C. Rodman (1992), we explore a similar idea of Europe as a site of, and actor within, global ‘crossings’, that problematize a boundaried, territorial and static idea of Europe and the European past. This means looking at ‘Europe’ as not limited to itself, but as transactional and made as much of vicissitude, movements and encounters as it is of purpose and tracts of land and sea. Europe and its locales might be conceived as both the ‘location of the intersection of disparate trajectories’ (Massey 1991, 29; 2004, 6) and the origin points of global outgoings. ‘Crossings’ may be found to be embodied in objects and encapsulated in moments, where different parties, peoples and cultures come into relation. These can highlight intersections of global trajectories that sometimes produce profound consequences whose longer and wider significance is not always immediately understood, and can only be guessed at in public-sphere discussions during or after the fact. Consider, for example, the Guestworker project in Germany and the Netherlands, the Refugee Crisis, and very possibly, Brexit.

In their own ways, each of the approaches outlined above seeks to see something specific about European memory, but without reducing it to a stock history of togetherness and unity, or invoking an ‘authentic’ and autochthonous European
culture. Both of the latter would involve dangerous fictions (that are indeed sometimes presented as truths for politically vicious purposes). Whitehead (2017), reviewing other key texts (Kockel 2010: 122; Pakier and Stråth 2010; Jarausch 2010), summarizes a key argument against the construction of a singular collective European memory:

the construction of a singular collective European memory is an attractive, but fundamentally self-defeating, means of creating a harmonious cultural space and legitimating the transformation into a ‘superstate’ within which individual nations would be happy to situate themselves (Pakier and Stråth 2010: 19) and of which people would be happy to call themselves citizens. In this view, constructing a singular collective European memory is self-defeating precisely because the attempt to identify common ground, shared lieux de mémoire and common roots ‘has the opposite effect of raising tensions and fostering disagreement’ (ibid). As a consequence, an alternative project emerges of demythologizing and deconstructing the notion of a single European memory, and by extension, a single heritage and identity – a project that is bolstered by reflection on the historical contingency of Europe as a mutable geopolitical construct and somewhat arbitrary patch of the globe, with a loose conglomeration of territories, seas and (only later on) of nation states.

Europe, in a realist view, contains divided memories and is made of difference, and at the political and civil level it has been argued that this is not material to be harmonized or erased from history, and that a more proper civil project is to work to acknowledge, recognize and in some way process division – not to ‘resolve’ it – so that it becomes an accepted fact in a situation of peaceful and respectful group relations (Sznaider 2013: 63; Pakier and Wawrzyniak 2016: 9). In other terms, as Klaus Eder argues, it might be possible to conceive ‘another path of European integration in which the people no longer appear as the sum of individuals living in Europe, but as people linked to each other as bearers of conflicting interests and ideas’ (2014: 221). This seems deeply paradoxical – that division might be the grounds for commonality – but it has as one benefit a sense of possibility for the accommodation of difference. As another, it seems to chime with the EU motto – ‘Unity in Diversity’ – and might suggest ways of thinking this through so that it becomes more than a convenient slogan. With increased attention to the nature, historical depth and effects of difference, the idea of Europe as a ‘cultural space of difference’ may nevertheless offer opportunities for historical reflection and awareness upon which more plural senses of belonging can be based. Such senses of belonging could be available to more people and more conducive to a communitarian ethics than the ‘either-or’ position outlined by Sharon Macdonald and Katja Fausser (2000: 9) – e.g. where people see themselves as either British or European, and liable instead to promote multiple sense of belonging and identity within subjects, or a ‘both-and’ position.

The national vs transnational dichotomy is also reductive. In the aforementioned CoHERE essay, Whitehead (2017) draws on Orhan Pamuk’s Museum Manifesto of 2012 to illustrate the capacity of the individual as a frame for refractions of multiple identifications that go beyond the national to encompass global and local forces, and Jeffrey Olick’s conceptualization of ‘orders’ and ‘systems’ of memory from the individual and family to the nation to the globe, between which there may be
slippages and leaps, and in which institutional and other forces may figure. These form compelling frames with which to reconceptualize identities in the European public sphere and to break any sense that a simplistic opposition, based on antagonistic place belongings, rules our lives. Our approach here cannot be comprehensive the scale, complexity and population of Europe mitigate against this, and even if it were possible to work quantitatively on this grand scale, the results would be insufficiently deep to grasp the circulation of the past in the present. Our best hope here is rather to sample cases – locations, groups, actions, phenomena, assemblages – that form, in our view, important paradigmatic indications of the social life and meanings of the past, and to amalgamate the insights that derive from them into a necessarily partial, but still revealing, account of a changing continent, its peoples, cultures and cleavages.

History, memory, heritage

For Halbwachs, one of the first scholars to address memory in social contexts, collective memory is extensive, so its boundaries are uncertain and irregular, whereas history reconstructs the past from a critical distance and divides it into fixed periods. Also, there are as many memories as groups but history ‘can be represented as the universal memory of the human species’ (Halbwachs [1926] 1950:78, 84). This distinction is, according to Astrid Erll, ‘one of Halbwachs less felicitous legacies’ (2008: 5) that was taken up and developed by historian and theorist Pierre Nora in a derogatory polemic against history as ‘abstract, totalizing, and “dead”’, and disconnected from real experience, compared to the living vitality and authenticity of memory. This critique of history is connected in Nora’s writing to a particular view of modernity as an era in which we are severed from ‘true’ memory, leading to a kind of obsession with the ‘authentic’ past that can no longer be directly experienced (1989). For Nora, ‘memory attaches itself to the sites, whereas history attaches itself to the events’ (1989: 22), and while this is suggestive for heritage practice with its focus on physical sites, there are significant overlaps and ambiguities. A site may be linked to a historical event, as with the demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Nora’s concept of the lieux de mémoire also suggests a geographical focus but is in fact applicable to a range of non-geographical and sometimes intangible objects, such as a national constitution or a novel. As a concept, it has been criticized as being so broad that it is difficult to use analytically. For example, Jeffrey Olick discusses this and asks whether there is anything that cannot be considered as a lieu de mémoire (2007: 21). Even if we use ‘lieux de mémoire’ in the more abstract sense not limited to physical sites, for example the Peace of Westphalia (one of the recipients of the European Heritage Label administered by the EU), it can be argued that it cannot be separated from the ‘events’ of history.

As Erll notes, studies on ‘history vs. memory’ are ‘usually loaded with emotionally charged binary oppositions: good vs. bad, organic vs. artificial, living vs. dead, from below vs. from above’. ‘History’ too is hard to pin down: is it ‘selective and meaningful memory vs. the unintelligible totality of historical events’? Or is it just memory with the ‘scientific’, seemingly neutral, disciplined and objective associations of ‘historiography’? In concluding her survey of this epistemological confusion, Erll suggests that such oppositions are useless, ‘a dead end in memory studies’ (2008: 6). She prefers instead an alternative focus on ‘modes of remembering in culture’ (original emphasis), based on the insight that the ‘past is not given, but
must instead be continually re-constructed and re-presented’. So a single event can be ‘remembered’ in multiple ways, and she cites myth, religious memory, political history, trauma, family memory and generational memory as different modes of remembering. There can be different modes of remembering identical past events. Erll gives the example of war, which:

can be remembered as a mythic event (“the war as apocalypse”), as part of political history (the First World War as “the great seminal catastrophe of the twentieth century”), as a traumatic experience (“the horror of the trenches, the shells, the barrage of gunfire,” etc.), as part of family history (“the war my great-uncle served in”), as a focus for bitter contestation (“the war which was waged by the old generation, by the fascists, by men”) (2006: 7).

Erll’s modes of remembering are not always distinct, and one person, museum or heritage representation may move between modes, for example in mixing personal, global and exemplary significance of an event, as well as appealing to disciplinary rigour and objectivity to secure truth status.

A cognate idea is that there are multiple relations with the past or ways of relating to the past that can be subsumed by broader concepts. For example, the first English-language journal allocated to the study of memory – History and Memory – aims to cover ‘the manifold ways in which the past shapes the present and is shaped by present perceptions’. In this sense memory is not opposed to history, notwithstanding the binary title, and the emphasis is instead on the past-present link, on the plural forms of interaction between past, present and future.

This builds on approaches that consider the past in terms of how it is constructed in the present. The Invention of Tradition by Hobsbawm and Ranger in 1983 is a key work in this perspective. The book explains the state’s major role in shaping collective memory. According to Hobsbawm, ‘traditions’ which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented’. They are ‘invented’ to symbolise social cohesion, to establish and legitimise the institutions and status of authority. It is ‘essentially a process of formalization and ritualization, characterized by reference to the past, if only by imposing repetition’ (1983: 1, 4). The repetition of certain values and norms, as a result, implies continuity with the past. However, where possible, states attempt to establish continuity with a ‘suitable’ historic past (ibid: 1). Three major innovations are used for implementation of traditions: the development of education, the invention of the public and the creation of ceremonies and the mass production of public monuments (ibid: 271). New powerful rituals and symbols are created to secure the loyalty for the state such as flags, national anthems and new celebrations. Hobsbawm exemplifies this by quoting d’Azeglio: ‘we made Italy: now we must make the Italians’ (ibid: 267).

Interest in invented tradition as a means of achieving social cohesion, and to establish and legitimise the institutions and status of authority is also present in other influential bodies of literature beyond the fields of memory and heritage studies. For example, political and social theorist Montserrat Guibernau’s work on belonging discusses the use of symbols and rituals by groups in order to effectively construct the groups, fostering emotional attachment and giving meaning to people’s lives through a sense of elective belonging (Guibernau 2013: 27). The Turkish celebrations of 1453 or national days connected to Atatürk can be considered in this light, in other words as ways of constructing groups through reference to histories that are made to matter,
because they are imbued with symbolic value for a notional collective group identity. In other museological work, we have contributed to the conceptualization of ‘constitution moments’ (Whitehead and Bozoğlu 2015: 254) in which ‘historicized identities are constituted in museum representations in relation to ‘moments’ of greater or lesser duration selected as being somehow pivotal for and emblematic of those identities’. This is similar to Rogers M. Smith’s notion of ‘ethical constitutive stories’, which describe who a given people are in terms of identity, providing a sense of ‘meaning, place, purpose, and pride’ (2003: 98), and to Iwona Irwin-Zarecka’s conceptualization of the memory community, containing not just people who ‘lived through’ a key event who belong, but also those for whom an event is a ‘key orienting force for their lives and public actions’ (1994: 49). As much as shared experience, it is the shared meaning attributed to a historical memory that makes the memory community. Barbie Zelizer suggests that we can belong simultaneously to different memory communities, relating, for example, to ethnicity, age, political orientation and so on (1998: 4). She draws on Hans Kellner to relate this to key historical stories, motifs or ‘vehicles’. The meanings attributed to a historical memory like the bombing of Dresden in 1945 depend on the social codes that prevail in a group, a time, or place and certain vehicles of memory are more helpful than others in allowing given communities to address significant shared agendas. Kellner notes that the very choice of a historical story as a symbolic resource for contemporary identity – something that we ‘resort to’, ‘depends on who we are, and what we need to know, which facts we wish to verify, and which to obscure’ (Zelizer 1998: 4; Kellner 1994).

Peter Aronsson also works with the concept of communities of memory, in the context of an overarching paradigm of ‘uses of the past’ of which history and heritage ‘proper’ are marginal but important outputs. The past is used by active performance of the ‘culture of history’ to form ‘definite opinions and action-oriented totalities’, i.e. to frame consciousness that liable to be acted upon. The ‘culture of history’ constitutes the totality of the artefacts, rituals, customs and assertions with references to the past, which allow us to trace, link and narrate the relationship between the past, present and future, forming an extended archive of the history of humanity’ (2015: 586). Particular communities may draw from the culture of history to create narratives that enfold values for identification and past-present-future links – a ‘regime or frame of how history is thought to be meaningful’ (ibid). These are subject to negotiation, not just within communities but through institutional practice: of schools, universities and heritage institutions.

This is suggestive for attention to the ways in which heritage and education practices function as a set of techniques for the cultural, historical, geographical and sometimes moral mapping of place, histories and groups at different scales – e.g. from neighbourhoods, towns and cities to regions, countries and Europe itself. Within a museum, for example, we may enquire what perspective on Europe emerges from displays and interpretations, in relation to which events, dates, phenomena, peoples and places (within Europe and outwith, as in the European colonies)? We can compare this to other museum representations, and to the ways in which Europe is constructed in other areas of practice, e.g. in curricula, music, festivals, and cuisine. Alongside this, we must also consider when unified European past and present-to-future commonality fails as a ‘regime or frame of how history is thought to be meaningful’ and other regimes prevail instead, the nation being one of the most visible alternatives.
As points of contrast with Aronsson’s ‘uses of the past’ Sharon Macdonald articulates a concept of ‘past-presencing’, to refer to how the past is brought into the present, through actions that can involve conscious or unconscious ‘remembering’ or ‘memory content’ (Macdonald 2013: 12). This relates to work in memory studies that present broad views of cultural memory as ‘the interplay of present and past in socio-cultural contexts’ (Erll: 2008: 1) or as ‘the many different ways in which the past constitutes the present, and the many ways in which we understand – and misunderstand – that constitution’ (Olick 2016: x). (A key question arising from these approaches for CoHERE is the extent to which people who ‘use’ the past or ‘do’ the past know what they are doing and do it purposively. Then come political and power-relations questions: if they know not what they do, then who does, and on what authority? On what grounds should people be educated through interventions and engagement, for example by educational and heritage institutions?)

For Astrid Erll, ‘remembering’ acts as another kind of meta-category. Remembering does not set history or memory, or indeed heritage, above the other. But while this may present different ‘modes’ as having equivalent value, resolving the kinds of oppositions set up in the works of Halbwachs and Nora, it does not solve the problem of establishing whether and how such ‘modes of remembering’ do actually differ. One possible perspective here is to see different modes of remembering as different affective or attitudinal positions that actors take towards the past. ‘History’ attaches to a ‘scientific’ attitude interested in the methodical and authoritative telling of verified narratives. Memory is an act of connecting the past directly or indirectly to our lives, even if the thing remembered took place before. Heritage is an attachment to pasts that are perceived to bear symbolic value for contemporary and future identities, a noun commonly ascribed through official discourse (Smith 2006), more often than not associated with the construction of a ‘we’ and warranting acts of preservation and presentation. (The significance of affect in our relations to the past connects with a new affective turn in heritage studies (e.g. Smith and Campbell 2015; Tolia-Kelly et al 2017), that offers a productive line of enquiry for Europe and for CoHERE if we take care to consider them relationally with cultural and identity politics, party politics and ideology, bringing different disciplinary perspectives into the mix.) However, history, memory and heritage still elide. One of the key characteristics that they share is the fact that they are precisely not discrete and easy to demarcate, and actually frequently interpenetrate. None of them, for example, is entirely ‘objective’ and dispassionate, notwithstanding the rhetorical techniques that ascribe value.

Irrespective of operational definitions such as those provided by UNESCO or by national and supranational agencies such as Historic England or the Council of Europe, ‘heritage’ is not a term with a consensus definition. It now has multiple associations – from our genetic backgrounds (as we understand them) to the ‘heritage industry’; indeed these are not disconnected now, as a DNA test industry that purports to help people understand their genetic ‘heritage’ is flourishing. It may refer to officially designated historic sites with material presence to ‘intangible cultural heritage’ such as dance, craft traditions and language (Harrison 2013).

Laurajane Smith’s idea of heritage as a form of discourse, typically associated with official representations (authorised heritage discourse, or AHD), helps to illuminate how not everything from the past becomes known as ‘heritage’. This is because of political decisions about what ‘counts’ as such are often connected to sanctioned
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stories of a group or nation. She characterizes this as an authoritarian project to demand that current generations ‘care for, protect and revere’ particular ‘objects, sites, places and/or landscapes…so that they may be passed on to nebulous future generations for their ‘education’, and to forge a sense of common identity based on the past’ (2006: 29). Smith identifies the machinery of AHD as lists, canons, bureaucracy, experts, professionals, non-inclusion of communities, hegemony, marginalization, the circulation of power to ‘speak’ of heritage among a cultural elite, and a ‘bounded’ and therefore easy-to-manage nature of heritage that can be at odds with the interests of non-elite groups. It also functions with a logic of universality:

Part of the authority of the European AHD…lies in its own legitimizing assumptions that it is universally applicable and that there is, or must be, universal cultural values and expressions. The whole discourse of universality is itself a legitimizing strategy for the values and nature of heritage that underline the AHD. The discourse of universality makes a moral plea to a sense of ‘brotherhood’ of ‘mankind’…this sort of appeal…adds to its persuasive power. (Smith 2006: 99)

AHD is ‘based on the Western national and elite class experiences, and reinforces ideas of innate cultural value tied to time depth, monumentality, expert knowledge and aesthetics’ (2006: 299). Heritage in this sense is a social and cultural process, often interconnected with power relations. Because of this, heritage is seen to have present-day value, in that it constitutes, as Ashworth et al argue in an influential text, the ‘use of the past as a cultural, political and economic resource for the present’ (2007: 3; emphasis added). Beyond this value for the present, further elaborations look to the future. Rodney Harrison characterizes this position:

Heritage is primarily not about the past, but instead about our relationship with the present and the future. As such, heritage poses urgent questions that arise as a result of our consideration of contemporary geopolitical issues. Heritage is not a passive process of simply preserving things from the past that remain, but an active process of assembling a series of objects, places and practices that we choose to hold up as a mirror to the present, associated with a particular set of values that we wish to take with us into the future. Thinking of heritage as a creative engagement with the past in the present focuses our attention on our ability to take an active and informed role in the production of our own ‘tomorrow’ (Harrison 2013: 4, original emphases).

This is well taken as a counter to uncritical assumptions about the intrinsic value of the past or its inert nature, as well as the variety of phenomena (objects, places, practices) that can come to count as heritage. But still a number of automatic queries emerge that are commonplace in heritage studies. The first of these is: who is the ‘we’ that decides what heritage is, and through what power relations are such actor groups and decisions constituted? Another bank of questions relates to the candidates for choice as heritage. Are they always ‘good’ in a civil sense, or things that ‘we’ want to take with us? What about the things that get left behind, ignored or unnoticed? Or things from the past that are taken up as ‘good’ by those with uncivil visions? Harrison’s idea of heritage as a kind of ‘mirror’ to the present is suggestive of the ways in which people look at the present through reference to the past, explaining ‘ourselves’ and our circumstances as connected to pasts. But this may not always occur positively or ‘progressively’ (in the political vernacular), as in some
people’s nostalgic yearning for mythic lost times when things were better, simpler and purer, which reduces to a lament about change and a diatribe against those perceived to be agents of change.

The main vehicles for the characterization and construction of ‘European heritage’ have, unlike the ‘European memory,’ been official rather than scholarly, although this is due to change because of the range of EU-funded research underway, and other forthcoming work, e.g. Delanty 2017). Notions of a common heritage (paradoxically incorporating a precious diversity of cultures) are common at the official level. The Maastricht Treaty, which entered into force in 1993, promises that the ‘Community [i.e. the EU] shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore,’ and supports the ‘improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of the culture and history of the European peoples’ (note the singular ‘culture and history’ and the plural ‘peoples’). A plethora of funding instruments are dedicated to making good on this – labels, prizes, heritage days, heritage routes, digital collections, conventions, and flagship exhibition centres and museums (such as the Parliamentarium and the new House of European History, both in Brussels) that tell the story of Europe. For all their benefits, these are top-down initiatives that can be problematized. Firstly, they may be perceived as constituting a particular strand of Smith’s AHD, and foisting upon people an identity story that is not felt, and liable to be resisted as the kind of cultural meddling that anti-EU activists lament. It may have limited purchase for national groups more generally. This is also compounded by the fact that there are often more visible heritage agencies and discourses at the national level, or indeed at the global level (particularly in UNESCO actions), meaning that European initiatives can appear to sit awkwardly between national and universalist valorizations and constructions of heritage. At worst, ideas of cultural and historical commonality can risk bolstering exclusivist and reactionary positions that view European heritage (often termed ‘civilization’ by its self-appointed defenders) is under threat from cultural others, as we will explore now.

In his 2009 essay ‘European Identity: historical fact and political problem’, Krzysztof Pomian sketches an ‘open inventory’ of the distinguishing features of Europe. He begins with those that can be perceived by the senses: ubiquitous crosses, city plans and neoclassical architecture, the European alphabet(s), the density of images in public and private space, human nudity in images, the ringing of bells, and the presence of Greek, Roman and mediaeval remains. He points out that ‘some of these features are specific to Europe, [and] some are present elsewhere too.’ However, ‘their coexistence creates a unique visual and aural landscape, which outside Europe can only be found in areas inhabited by Europeans.’

Non-perceptual items within the inventory include the organization of time (weeks, years, holidays), its ‘cultural references’ in Christianity, Ancient Greece and Rome, the arts, political norms and so on. Again, for Pomian, these are not exclusively European, but ‘if we were to treat them statistically and project the results on a map, it is almost certain that the cluster would have the greatest density in Europe’. After this come: secularity (‘the separation of politics and religion and of citizenship from adherence to a religion or a confession’); the status of women, because of monogamous marriage, how women are not compelled to cover their faces, and their essential role in European culture and politics; the lack of dietary restrictions
('another legacy of Christianity different to Judaism and Islam'); and the ‘habits manifest in everyday life and materialized in the furniture of European homes and offices’. The particular assemblage of these in present-day Europe, argues Pomian, is the outcome of a long history. This begins ‘somewhere around the middle of the first millennium before Christ’ through Celtic-Greek and Roman-Barbarian encounters. Then, among other phenomena, Christianity in its western and eastern developments, the crusades and Ottoman conquest, the Reformation. There are ‘borrowings from outside’, such as the compass and gunpowder, but there are forms of secular civil organization proper to Europe, and the Enlightenment. There are national consciousness and rivalries, tempered by a commonality that was not broken but remade by the horrors of the twentieth century.

Pomian’s essay is, on one hand, a thoroughgoing attempt to hitch ‘present-day’ landscape of heritage in myriad forms with the historical processes that have produced it, and thus to account for the relative specificity of Europe and make a claim for the particularity of European identity that goes above and beyond national identifications. To be sure, Pomian does not ignore conflicts and tensions, or global mobilities, inside-outside dynamics and encounters; he does not construct European identity primarily on an ethnic basis. Nor does he suggest that the ‘historical fact’ of Europe is not a ‘political problem’. But almost inevitably, this same approach runs risks. These involve: the inclusions and exclusions within the descriptive history (what things count, in the process that leads to today, or in other words, what is chosen as heritage and what is not?); the general validity of claims made, for example about the status of women; and the possibility that such claims might contribute to othering, as in the suggestion that women covering their faces is not ‘European’ behaviour.

Identifying the special conditions of European history and heritage has a certain liability, which is to admit understandings Europe as a monoculture that has specific ways of being and doing, potentially leading some to act strategically or defensively to keep it as such. This protectionist urge can manifest as hatred or violence towards those perceived to be outsiders, or to those who would welcome and celebrate diversity, mixing and multicultural. This is particularly important in the case of Islam and Islamophobia in Europe today. As CoHERE progresses we aim to unpick the strands of historical references and heritage claims in the political and ideological discourse of those who would ‘use’ the past for purposes of exclusion, as well as those who would use it to build notional progressive identities.

The identification of a discrete and unified heritage of Europe runs into the same difficulties of coverage and application encountered elsewhere in this review. Historical circumstances, contingencies and ‘process’ to use Pomian’s term, might be seen to be so different across the piece that it makes little sense to think about European heritage as anything other than a range of plural ‘heritages’, that can be assembled into all sorts of historical relations instead of or as well as a ‘European’ history (consider the case of Al-Andalus). Indeed, at the official level this totalizing liability is kept in check by the emphasis on cultural diversity, but the detail of this paradox requires attention both at the level of the making of history and the public culture of memory and heritage. Instead of a Europe-wide construction of commonality, it may be that more local foci bring greater rewards in the form of smaller-scale connectivities. Here we might consider the possibilities for heritage
action of transcultural flows that have accreted into commonalities of some form, and into material and intangible deposits: historical mobilities connected to Roman or Viking civilization, trade routes, modes of industry. Non-mobile commonalities may obtain because morphological features of place (land, weather) produce comparable circumstances and cultural sharings (e.g. the similarity between small-scale agricultural dwellings in peat landscapes in western Norway and Scotland).

As Aronsson and others have implied, memory communities negotiate the past, and they do so within their own constituencies and with other institutions and groups. The importance of shifting scholarly attention from heritage in the form of official acts and valorizations has recently been counterbalanced by engagement with ‘heritage from below’. As Iain M. Robertson states:

Heritage is about more than visitors, audiences and consumption. It is about more than access to economic resources. It is about people, collectivity and individuals, and about their sense of inheritance from the past and the uses to which this inheritance is put (Robertson 2012: 1).

This is a useful reminder that phenomena that do not secure an official label as ‘heritage’ may still be productively thought of as such. This is a critical component of the CoHERE project, which identifies heritage as ‘happening’ at official and non-official levels, and indeed within interactions between them, as when multivocal accounts of people’s place belongings or life histories ‘make it’ into the museum through co-production or oral history initiatives, but also when politicians are forced to take note of the cultural memories mobilized by dissident groups. This returns us to the political territory of the CoHERE project.

CoHERE: key concepts and orientations

CoHERE takes as its touchstones the core challenge of the EC’s 2014 REFLECTIVE 2 sub-call and its key assumptions. The core challenge is ‘to explore and show how critical reflection on the historical, cultural and normative roots of Europe’s cultural and democratic practices and institutions contribute to an evolving European identity today’. The REFLECTIVE 2 assumptions relate to the importance of cultural heritage for communitarian social relations, individual personal development and inclusive senses of belonging. Valorizing, sustaining and transmitting cultural heritage are understood as a powerful means of overcoming an ‘EU crisis’ marked by social and cultural divisions, disparities of wealth between nations, regions and groups, and reduced confidence in the political and social project of the EU. These positions are reflected in the report of the Council of Europe’s Conclusions on Cultural Heritage as a Strategic Resource for a Sustainable Europe (2014) and the Horizon 2020 Expert Group on heritage: Getting Heritage to Work for Europe. In the latter heritage is presented not as a cost to society and a financial burden but as a boon to the European economy and a means of fostering ‘greater unity and cohesion of European citizens’, overcoming the challenges of demographic change, migration and political disengagement (2014: 7).

Our response to this was one of general subscription to the idea that heritage can produce civil and societal benefits (as we see them, as situated individuals with our own political viewpoints), but that this should be tempered by a realist understanding of the ways in which heritage can be used against civility, against EU values, against unity and against difference. This means engaging in instrumental cultural politics.
while at the same time thinking critically through the problematics of this. It involves recognition that there is a necessary attachment of ethics to heritage that often manifests in tacit or overt prescription. Soon, we are led inevitably to axiological discussions about exactly which human and social values, if any, constitute absolute goods. Following this, other questions emerge: why, and (sometimes) where and when did such values develop, or through which historical processes and memory practices – for example through reflection on ‘never-again’ iniquities such as genocides? If (European) heritage is understood not as an essential quantity but as contingent, as something mobilized and active within ethical constructs, then it is necessary for projects responding to the REFLECTIVE 2 call to take a position about what is good – again, from the subjective and political standpoint of the researchers and notwithstanding the cultural relativisms that emerge as automatic objections to moral expressions. In this sense, CoHERE is concerned at the most basic level with valorizing European heritages that enable: the development of identities based upon communitarian and egalitarian attitudes; non-prejudicial openness to difference; a commitment to peace; historical awareness; and equal opportunities for social and cultural participation. It is clear that heritage can be and often is active within quite different ethical constructs – even classifiable as malign – and CoHERE will engage with these as important phenomena and problematics.

We take a broad but delimited understanding of heritage (mindful of the notorious difficulty of assigning a consensus definition, as discussed) as a representational, discursive and performative practice involving attempts to valorize aspects of the past in the present, as well as the forging of contemporary connections and disconnections with events, cultures and sites from prehistory to the recent past. Heritage can be official or unofficial, tangible or intangible, or mixtures of these. It may not always be a social good productive of perceived-to-be progressive identities, respectful intergroup relations or benign moral positions, suggesting the existence of plural ‘heritages’ that are sometimes in conflict with one another, rather than a monolithic ‘common heritage’. As Ashworth et al posit, ‘even within a single society, past, heritages and identities should be considered as plurals’ (2007: 2), and we have seen that there is significant doubt that Europe can be considered as a ‘single society’, and also whether it ever could, will be or should be. Ashworth et al’s dictum that heritage is ‘open to constant revision and change and is also both a source and a repercussion of social conflict’ (2007: 3) applies in Europe as much as anywhere.

These statements form starting points for the project, which will build on some of the theory and practice relating to European heritage and memory outlined above, as well as developing new theorizations. As noted, our focus is primarily on the representational dimensions of heritage practice as a conscious mode of valorizing the past in the present (and in creating grounds for the future), whether through: upholding, reviving or inventing traditions; performative re-enactments; reconstructions (e.g. of buildings); conservation decisions; commemorative practices; presentations of historical tangible and intangible culture; or imbuing and mobilizing particular historical stories and phenomena with key significance for contemporary identities. We attend to different kinds of valorization, such as: the positive celebration of heritages (e.g. Celtic) in festivals and public events; the valorization of Europe’s ‘dark pasts’ (Macdonald and Fausser 2000) such as the Holocaust as opportunities for regret, reflection and pro-active ‘never-again’ politics; and mobilizations of histories, symbols and heritage discourses by diverse groups in
protests, against states, policies or others. We also examine the prevalence of particular kinds and objects of valorization, seeking to understand the cultural politics of this.

This involves a view of heritage as not separable from, or hierarchically above, memory and identity, following other scholarly constructions like ‘heritage-memory-identity triad’ (Anheier and Raj Isar 2011), or Macdonald’s ‘memory complex’, which is, as its author says, a shorthand for a ‘memory-heritage-identity complex’ because these constituents are so tightly interwoven (2013: 5). Indeed, from the review above it can be seen that the separate articulation of terms such as memory, identity, heritage and history can be unhelpful; here, we bring to bear our adaptation of Erl’s ‘modes of remembering’ as an affective range. The CoHERE account of heritage is a work-in-progress; it is not watertight and has its limitations. Although it deals with absences and occlusions it is still informed by a primary interest in representation, even where a representation may be an apparently authorless assemblage. Indeed, it can help to ask what myriad things a heritage production can be, what ‘authorship’ of heritage is, who ‘does’ it, why, and in which social relations. The ‘forges of contemporary connections and disconnections with events, cultures and sites’ can be declared or undeclared, purposeful or unconsidered. It is a prism that makes for certain refractions.

One of its strengths, in the context of the disciplinary mess of nomenclature hinted at above, is to prompt attention to the elisions between categories, to the relations between conscious and unconscious representation, or to those between what is chosen as heritage and what is latent but ignored. We think of this as a kind of critical heritage studies in a number of senses. One of these is provided by the scholarly turn associated with the term, involving, as stated in the manifesto of the association for Critical Heritage Studies, a critical interrogation of the naturalized values associated with heritage, to understand it as a political act and locus of power relations (Smith 2012: 535). The other sense in which we deploy ‘critical’ is to indicate where heritage is involved or implicated in social crisis. A crisis is a time of ‘intense difficulty and danger’ as the Oxford English Dictionary puts it, where a ‘critical situation or problem has the potential to become disastrous’. In a further meaning of ‘critical’ we may consider whether heritage has a ‘decisive or crucial importance in the success, failure, or existence of something’. This brings out a different way of thinking from ‘difficult heritage’ about the gravity of past-present constructions: what something (given identities, projects, nations, social groups and relations…) is heritage critical for? This goes to the heart of the EU’s instrumental paradigm, that assumes that something can be achieved by way of heritage and that this might mitigate the effects of an ‘EU Crisis’. However, a critical issue is that this crisis is partly built of history, memory and heritage, which often form the supports for disaffection, division and the expression of resentment and antagonism.

On these grounds, CoHERE needs to engage with the ways in which heritage, memory and history have been implicated in social division, and reframe them in order to destabilize the grounds of antagonism. As Klaus Eder argues, crisis is upsetting (2014: 221). People and institutions struggle to deal with it and one of its effects is to induce ‘critical’ situations that force people to make sense’ of things (ibid). CoHERE has the purpose of understanding that sense-making as it relates to ‘modes of remembering’ in Europe, whether in the form of ‘heritage’, ‘memory’
‘history’ or in broader cultures of ‘doing the past’. At the same time, there is an opportunity for CoHERE to promote particular reframings of crisis and heritage and to model mechanisms liable to produce civil benefits. Divisions, tensions and antagonisms, as much as the constructions of unity and commonality that this review has explored, must be faced critically, and understood as critical, in order to enable forms of cohesion that both acknowledge and subsume difference.

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