



Critical Heritages (CoHERE): performing and representing identities in Europe

Work Package 2: Work in Progress

Critical Analysis Tool (CAT) 2: The rise of populist extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity

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CoHERE explores the ways in which identities in Europe are constructed through heritage *representations* and *performances* that connect to ideas of place, history, tradition and belonging. The research identifies existing heritage practices and discourses in Europe. It also identifies means to sustain and transmit European heritages that are likely to contribute to the evolution of inclusive, communitarian identities and counteract disaffection with, and division within, the EU. A number of modes of representation and performance are explored in the project, from cultural policy, museum display, heritage interpretation, school curricula and political discourse to music and dance performances, food and cuisine, rituals and protest.

WP2 investigates public/popular discourses and dominant understandings of a homogeneous 'European heritage' and the ways in which they are mobilized by specific political actors to advance their agendas and to exclude groups such as minorities from a stronger inclusion into European society. What notions of European heritage circulate broadly in the public sphere and in political discourse? How do the 'politics of fear' relate to such notions of European heritage and identity across and beyond Europe and the EU? How is the notion of a European heritage and memory used not only to include and connect Europeans but also to exclude some of them? We are interested in looking into the relationship between a European memory and heritage-making and circulating notions of 'race', ethnicity, religion and civilization as well as contemporary forms of discrimination grounded in the idea of incommensurable cultural and memory differences.

This essay reveals the social, political and economic sources of the populist zeitgeist in the European Union. The essay starts with an analysis of the current state of populist extremism in Europe. Subsequently, it elaborates different aspects of the current political framework in which populist political rhetoric is becoming strongly rooted in a time characterized with globalism, multiculturalism bashing, financial crisis, refugee crisis, Islamophobia, terror, Euroscepticism, and nativism.

Keywords: Globalism, Euroscepticism, diversity, multiculturalism, nativism, financial crisis, refugee crisis.

Ayhan Kaya

The Rise of Populist Extremism in Europe: Lost in Diversity and Unity

Introduction

This essay reveals the social, political and economic sources of the populist zeitgeist in the European Union. The essay starts with an analysis of the current state of populist extremism in Europe. Subsequently, it elaborates different aspects of the current political framework in which populist political rhetoric is becoming strongly rooted in a time characterized with globalism, multiculturalism bashing, financial crisis, refugee crisis, Islamophobia, terror, Euroscepticism, and nativism. This essay is the initial stage of an ongoing work (WP2 in the CoHERE Project) to offer social, economic, political and cultural sources of the current populist movements in five EU countries (Germany, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands) as well as in Turkey. The essay will start with the elaboration of the contemporary acts of populism. This work in progress aims to display the social-economic basis of the populist rhetoric without falling into the trap of culturalizing what is social, political and economic in origin.

Current state of populist extremism in Europe

Extremist populist parties and movements constitute a force in several EU member states. At the very heart of the story about the rise of both radical right and right-wing violent extremism is a disconnect between politicians and their electorates. Right-wing populist parties in particular have gained greater public support in the last decade. Some of these parties are as follows: The Jobbik Party in Hungary, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, Danish People's Party in Denmark, Swedish Democrats in Sweden, the *Front National* and *Bloc Identitaire* in France, *Vlaams Belang* in Belgium, True Finns in Finland, *Lega Nord* and *Casa Pound* in Italy, the Freedom Party in Austria, *Die Freiheit* in Germany¹, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the English Defence League, the British National Party, UKIP in the UK, the Five Star Movement in Italy, and Golden Dawn in Greece.

Recent research suggests that these parties and movements are now a durable force in Europe. For instance, in Austria, the extreme-right Freedom Party is the most popular movement among 18-25 year olds; and support for the leader of the French *Front National*, Marine Le Pen, is found to be stronger among the younger voters. This suggests that these parties and movements may have a bigger potential to become influential political actors in the long-term. The Party for Freedom in the Netherlands won 15.5 per cent of the votes in the 2010 general elections and became the third largest party in the Dutch Parliament with 24 seats. The Freedom Party in Austria won 17.5 per cent of the votes in the 2008 general elections, and it is currently reported to be on a par with the SPÖ (Social-Democratic Party) and ÖVP (People's Party) as a major contender in the next parliamentary elections. It has also to be noted that the recent electoral failure and consequent political disintegration of the British National Party (BNP) seems to be one of the causes of a rise in racial violence, according to a recent survey of more than 2000 affiliates of the BNP and UKIP (UK Independence Party). There is evidence that those on the far-right feel betrayed by the political system and are prepared, hypothetically at least, to take the law

¹ *Die Freiheit (Bürgerrechtspartei für mehr Freiheit und Demokratie)* was established in Bavaria in 2011. In September 2013, the party lost 2/3 of their former members to the *AfD*. Soon after it was founded, it started to shrink and lose its members to the *AfD*. The founder of the party, Rene Stadtkewitz, supported the members of the Party to be affiliated with the *AfD*. In early 2016, the party had less than 500 members.

into their own hands to defend what they see as ‘the British way of life’ against an onslaught by non-whites and, particularly, Muslims (The Spectator, 2012).

It seems that extremist populist movements are recently investing in the North-South divide in Europe, leading to both extreme right-wing, and left-wing populist parties capitalizing on different discourses and tools. Tensions between wealthy countries in the North contributing most to the bailouts, and the ailing debtor nations in the Southern periphery, threaten to destroy the monetary union within the European Union. The electoral successes of right-wing populist parties could indeed worsen the Eurozone crisis. As of August 2016, in the European Parliament (EP), far-right populist political parties have their own political group, namely the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), which is the seventh largest political group in the EP with 46 MEPs. The other right-wing populist group in the European Parliament is the Europe of Nations and Freedom Group (ENF) with 36 MEPs, presided by Marine Le Pen. On the other hand, the left-wing populist MEPs form the Confederal Group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) with 52 MEPs.²

The Power of Social Media

The rise in popularity of extremist populist political movements goes hand-in-hand with the intensification of online social media in politics. The online social media following for many of these parties dwarfs formal membership, consisting of tens of thousands of sympathisers and supporters. This mix of virtual and real political activity is the way millions of people, especially young people, relate to politics in the 21st century (Barlett et al, 2011). The changing role of the media, especially social media, has certainly emancipated citizens in a way that has led to the demystification of the political office and political parties. More and more people tend to believe that they have a good understanding of what politicians do, and think that they can do better (Mudde, 2004: 556). Almost all the populist parties and movements exploit the new social media to communicate their statements and messages to large segments of the society, who no longer seem to rely on the mainstream media. These political groups are known to oppose immigration, heterogeneity, multiculturalism, and ethno-cultural and religious diversity. They are also known for their ‘anti-establishment’ views and their concern for protecting a homogeneous national culture and heritage. Their popularity springs from various factors in the current globalised economies, leading to a growing sense of insecurity and uncertainty. Beppe Grillo, the leader of Five Star Movement in Italy is a very good example of a party leader managing to mobilize millions of people by Twitter, Facebook and his personal blog (beppegrillo.it) (Moffitt, 2016: 88). Geert Wilders (@geertwilderspvv) is also very successful in exploiting the internet to mobilize masses. In 2012, the Party for Freedom, which he leads, organized a website to invite the Dutch citizens to express their complaints about the migrants coming from central and Eastern Europe.³ *Digital populism* has become a spectre roaming around Europe for all the mainstream political parties.

Social media has unquestionably contributed to the development of deliberative democracy or participative democracy. Earlier forms of this kind of democracy were successfully generated by the populist demands of the New Left, the New Social Movements, and the Greens back in the 1960s, 1970s and even today in the Tahrir Square, Occupy Wall Street, Indignados, Gezi Park, and Maidan movements. The populism of the New Left, as eloquently summarized by Cas Mudde (2004: 557), refers to an active, self-confident, well-educated, progressive people. Contrastingly, the people of right-wing populism are the hard-working, conservative, reactionary, and nationalist citizens who see their world being distorted by progressives, elites, institutions, criminals, aliens and refugees. The kind of

² See the official website of the European Parliament for a detailed map of the political groups represented in the Parliament, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/hemicycle.html> accessed on 30 August 2016.

³ ‘Dutch website causes stir in Central Europe,’ *Euractiv*, 10 February 2012, <http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/dutch-website-causes-stir-in-central-europe/>

democracy pursued by right-wing populists also greatly differs from the kind that left-wing populist supporters pursue. Contrary to common belief, right-wing populist voters do not strongly favour any form of participatory democracy, be it deliberative or plebiscitary. Populists are not interested in expanding participative democratic processes; rather, they support referendums as an instrument to overcome the power of the elite. What they want is the problems of the ordinary wo/man to be solved by a remarkable leader in accordance with their own values. In other words, as Taggart (2000: 1) put it very well, ‘populism requires the most extra-ordinary individuals to lead the most ordinary people.’

The culturalization of what is social, political and economic

Some of these factors are related to the rise of unemployment, poverty, inequality, injustice, the growing gap between citizens and politics and the current climate of political disenchantment. For instance, in the spring of 2014, youth unemployment in Greece was 62.5 per cent, in Spain 56.4 per cent, in Portugal, 42.5 per cent, and in Italy 40.5 per cent.⁴ As for the Central and Eastern European countries, we should recall that the collapse of the USSR has allowed long-suppressed national aspirations to find their outlet in ethno-nationalist extreme right-wing political parties and movements. The JOBBIK Party in Hungary, built upon such ethno-nationalist inspirations, is a good example (Dettke, 2014). From the 1980s onwards, the introduction of neo-liberal policies has contributed to social and economic insecurity (Mudde, 2007). These policies implied that individuals were expected to take care of themselves within the framework of existing free market conditions. This led to the fragmentation of society into a multitude of cultural, religious and ethnic communities in which individuals sought refuge. In turn, ruling elites, which include vote-seeking political parties, exploited these basic needs for protection by adopting discriminatory discourses and stigmatizing the ‘others’.

The rhetoric of a ‘clash of civilizations’ also seems to be legitimising populist extremist politicians, who claim the impossibility of a peaceful coexistence between ethno-culturally and religiously different groups (Kaya, 2012a). Populist extremist movements are also shaped by the ideology of consumerism. A consumerist culture, which widens the gap between the wealthy and the dispossessed, contributes to people’s fears and insecurities. A study conducted in the UK reveals that the recent riots in London and other large cities in the UK and Europe reflect a deeply inadequate economic and social ethos, imbalanced consumption, the breakdown of accountability, distrust in institutions, and severe government failings over more than two decades (The Guardian, 22 August 2011).

What is mainly a social and political problem is often being reduced to a cultural and religious clash in a way that disrupts peace and social cohesion (Brown, 2006; Kaya, 2012a). The growing popularity of this type of rhetoric has deepened existing ethno-cultural and religious barriers between groups. As a result, the universal nature of human rights is being replaced by alternative views, which use culture, ethnicity, religion and civilisation as markers to define and stigmatise those with a different background.

The backlash against multiculturalism: Lost in Diversity

Extremist populist parties and movements often exploit the issue of migration and portray it as a threat against the welfare and the social, cultural and even ethnic features of a nation. Populist leaders also tend to blame a soft approach to migration for some of the major problems in society such as unemployment, violence, crime, insecurity, drug trafficking and human trafficking. This tendency is reinforced by the use of a racist, xenophobic and demeaning rhetoric. The use of words like ‘influx’, ‘invasion’, ‘flood’ and ‘intrusion’ are just a few examples. Public figures like Geert Wilders in the

⁴ See <http://www.statista.com/statistics/266228/youth-unemployment-rate-in-eu-countries/>. One should be informed about the fact that by September 2016 there was a significant improvement in the unemployment rates of these countries: Greece 50.4 per cent, Spain 43.9 per cent, Italy 36.9 per cent, and Portugal 28.6 per cent.

Netherlands, Heinz-Christian Strache in Austria and others have spoken of a ‘foreign infiltration’ of immigrants, especially Muslims, in their countries. Geert Wilders even predicted the coming of *Eurabia*, a mythological future continent that will replace modern Europe (Wossen, 2010), where children from Norway to Naples will learn to recite the Koran at school, while their mothers stay at home wearing *burqas*.

It is also true that much public attention has recently been focused on Eastern Europeans. Consider the recent controversy around the ‘website for complaints about Middle and Eastern Europeans’, created by the Dutch Freedom Party in the Netherlands, which asked people to provide information about the ‘nuisance’ associated with migrant workers or how they had lost jobs to them. On 22 February 2012, in a letter to Foreign Minister Uri Rosenthal, Secretary General Thorbjørn Jagland asked the Dutch government to clarify its position regarding this website, and expressed the hope that the Dutch government would publicly distance itself from its content.⁵ The Dutch parliament voted in March 2012 to denounce the Freedom Party’s website, but the Dutch government, whose majority in the 150-seat lower house required support from the PVV’s 23 lawmakers, has declined to condemn it.⁶ This is only one among several events that are transforming the image of the Netherlands as a tolerant and immigrant-friendly country. On 10 April 2012, *Vlaams Belang*, a Belgian far-right party, launched a website that invites people to report crimes committed by illegal immigrants, mirroring a similar site in the Netherlands set up by the far-right Freedom Party. The website invites people to file anonymous tip-offs about social security fraud, black-market work more serious crimes. *Vlaams Belang* was previously known as *Vlaams Blok*, but the political force had to change its name in 2004 after Belgium’s Court of Cassation found it in violation of the law against racism. Filip Dewinter, the *Vlaams Belang* leader, defended the website because of the presence of ‘tens of thousands of illegal immigrants’ in Belgian cities and the problems stemming from them. This type of thinking and political discourse have attracted public support *vis-à-vis* an ‘enemy within’ who is created through the actual politics of fear.

A remarkable part of the European public perceive diversity as a key threat to the social, cultural, religious and economic security of the European nations. There is an apparent growing resentment against the discourse of diversity, which is often promoted by the European Commission, the Council of Europe, many scholars, politicians and NGOs. The stigmatisation of migration has brought about a political discourse, which is known as ‘the end of multiculturalism and diversity.’ This is built upon the assumption that the homogeneity of the nation is at stake and has to be restored by alienating those who are not part of an apparently autochthonous group that is ethno-culturally and religiously homogenous. After the relative prominence of multiculturalism both in political and scholarly debates, today we can witness a dangerous tendency to find new ways to accommodate ethno-cultural and religious diversity. Evidence of a diminishing belief in the possibility of a flourishing multicultural society has changed the nature of the debate about the successful integration of migrants in host societies.

Initially, the idea of multiculturalism involved conciliation, tolerance, respect, interdependence, universalism, and it was expected to bring about an ‘inter-cultural community’. Over time, it began to be perceived as a way of institutionalising difference through autonomous cultural discourses. The debate on the end of multiculturalism has existed in Europe for a long time. It seems that the declaration of the ‘failure of multiculturalism’ has become a catchphrase not only of extreme-right wing parties but also of centrist political parties all across the continent (Kaya, 2010). In 2010 and 2011, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy heavily bashed multiculturalism for the wrong reasons (Kaya, 2012a). Geert Wilders, leader of the Freedom Party in the Netherlands, made no apologies for arguing that ‘[we, Christians] should be

⁵ Press release 22 February 2012.

⁶ Euractiv, *Belgian far-right emulates the Dutch xenophobic website*, 11 April 2012.


proud that our culture is better than Islamic culture’ (Der Spiegel, 11 September 2011). Populism blames multiculturalism for denationalizing one’s own nation, and disunifying one’s own people. Anton Pelinka (2013: 8) explains very well how populism simplifies the complex realities of a globalized world by looking for a scapegoat:

As the enemy – the foreigner, the foreign culture- has already succeeded in breaking into the fortress of the nation state, someone must be responsible. The elites are the secondary ‘defining others’, responsible for the liberal democratic policies of accepting cultural diversity. The populist answer to the complexities of a more and more pluralistic society is not multiculturalism... Right-wing populism sees multiculturalism as a recipe to denationalize one’s nation, to deconstruct one’s people.

For the right-wing populist crowds, the answer must be easy. They need to have some scapegoats to blame. The scapegoat should be the others: foreigners, Jews, Roma, Muslims, sometimes the Eurocrats, sometimes the non-governmental organizations. Populist rhetoric certainly pays off for those politicians who engage in it. For instance, Thilo Sarrazin was perceived in Germany as a folk hero (*Volksheld*) on several right-wing populist websites that strongly refer to his ideas and statements after his polemical book *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen (Germany Does Away with Itself: How We Gambled with Our Country)*, which was published in 2010. The newly-founded political party *Die Freiheit* even tried to involve Sarrazin in their election campaign in Berlin and stated *Wählen gehen für Thilos Thesen* (Go and vote for Thilo’s statements) using a crossed-out mosque as a logo.⁷ Neo-fascist groups like the right-wing extremist National Democratic Party (NPD) have also celebrated the author. They stated that Sarrazin’s ideas about immigration were in line with the NPD’s programme and that he made their ideas even stronger and more popular, as he belonged to an established social democratic party.

Few in Europe say growing diversity makes their country a better place to live

Overall, do you think having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities in our country makes this country a better place to live, a worse place to live or doesn’t make much difference either way?



Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey.
 PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 1. Perceptions of diversity in the EU (Source: PEW 2016 Spring Global Attitudes Survey)

A recent survey conducted in Spring 2016 by the PEW Research Centre shows that many Europeans are uncomfortable with the growing diversity of society (Figure 1). When asked whether having an increasing number of people of many different races, ethnic groups and nationalities makes their country a better or worse place to live, relatively few said it makes their country better. In Greece and Italy, at

⁷ See <http://www.morgenpost.de/politik/inland/article105070241/Pro-Deutschland-ueberklebt-Sarrazin-Plakate.html>

least more than half said increasing diversity harms their country, while in the Netherlands, Germany and France, less than half complained about ethno-cultural diversity (PEW, 2016).

Islamophobia as a new ideology

These populist outbreaks contribute to the securitisation and stigmatisation of migration in general, and Islam in particular. In the meantime, they deflect attention from constructive solutions and policies widely thought to promote integration, including language-learning and increased labour market access, which are already suffering due to austerity measures across Council of Europe member states. Islamophobic discourse has recently become the mainstream in the west (Kaya, 2011: and Kaya, 2015b). It seems that social groups belonging to the majority nation in a given territory are more inclined to express their distress resulting from insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the language of Islamophobia; even in those cases that are not related to the actual threat of Islam. Several decades ago it was Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) who stated that social-political discontent of people is likely to lead them to anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, regionalism, supernationalism, fascism and anti-cosmopolitanism. If Lipset's timely intervention in the 1950s is transposed to the contemporary age, then one could argue that Islamophobia has also become one of the paths taken by those who are in a state of social-economic and political dismay. Islamophobic discourse has certainly resonated very much in the last decade, and its users have been heard by both local and international communities, although their distress has not resulted from really anything related to Muslims in general. In other words, Muslims have become the most popular scapegoats in many parts of the world to blame for any troubled situation. For almost more than a decade, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants are primarily seen by European societies as a financial burden, and virtually never as an opportunity for the country. They tend to be associated with illegality, crime, violence, drug abuse, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict, and in many other respects are represented in negative ways (Kaya, 2015b).

The construction of a contemporary European identity is built in part on anti-Muslim racism, just as other forms of racist ideology played a role in constructing European identity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Use of the term 'Islamophobia' assumes that fear of Islam is natural and can be taken for granted, whereas use of the term 'Islamophobiaism' presumes that this fear has been fabricated by those with a vested interest in producing and reproducing such a state of fear, or phobia. By describing Islamophobia as a form of *ideology*, I argue that Islamophobia operates as a form of *cultural racism* in Europe which has become apparent along with the process of *securitizing* and *stigmatizing* migration and migrants in the age of neoliberalism (Kaya, 2015b). One could thus argue that Islamophobiaism as an ideology is being constructed by ruling political groups to foster a kind of false consciousness, or delusion, within the majority society, as a way of covering up their own failure to manage social, political, economic, and legal forces and consequently the rise of inequality, injustice, poverty, unemployment, insecurity, and alienation. In other words, Islamophobiaism turns out to be a practical instrument of social control used by the conservative political elite to ensure compliance and subordination in this age of neoliberalism, essentializing ethnocultural and religious boundaries. Muslims have become global 'scapegoats', blamed for all negative social phenomena. One could also argue that Muslims are now being perceived by some individuals and communities in the West as having greater social power. There is a growing fear in the United States, Europe, and even in Russia and the post-Soviet countries that Muslims will eventually take over demographically.

A PEW survey held in 2006 indicated that opinions of Muslims in almost all of the western European countries are quite negative. While one in four in the USA and the UK displayed Islamophobic sentiments, more than half of Spaniards and half of Germans said that they disliked Muslims; and the figures for Poland and France for those holding unfavourable opinions of Muslims were 46 per cent and

38 per cent. The survey revealed that prejudice was mainly marked among older generations and appeared to be class-based. People over 50 and of low education were more likely to be prejudiced.⁸ Similarly, the Gallup Organization Survey of Population Perceptions and Attitudes undertaken for the World Economic Forum in 2007 indicated that three in four US residents believe that the Muslim world *is not* committed to improving relations with the West. The same survey finds out that half of respondents in Italy (58 per cent), Denmark (52 per cent), and Spain (50 per cent) agree with this view. Israelis, on the other hand, represent a remarkable exception with almost two-thirds (64 per cent) believing that the Muslim world *is* committed to improving relations. The image on the other side of the coin is not very different. Among the majority-Muslim nations surveyed, it was found that majorities in every Middle Eastern country believe that the West is not committed to bettering relations with the Muslim World, while respondents in majority-Muslim Asian countries are about evenly split (WEF, 2008: 21).

In the Netherlands, the hardening of political discourse, stimulated by dramatic events such as 9/11, the assassination of Pim Fortuyn in 2002 and Theo van Gogh in 2004, and the rise of populist and extremist parties with anti-immigrant agendas, have resulted in an increasingly polarised debate on Islam and on cultural diversity (Carr, 2006). Similarly, in Switzerland, a country where relations between the host society and Muslims remain very limited, the negative perception of Muslims was explicitly articulated by the majority society through the debate on minarets in December 2009. The requests by the Muslim community to erect mosques and minarets aroused significant public opposition in various cities. The Swiss majority vote in the 2009 referendum to ban the building of minarets is unfortunately not an isolated example of this trend (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2009). What was striking in the Swiss Referendum on minarets is that those Swiss citizens who did not have any interaction with the Muslim community in their everyday life were more inclined to oppose the erection of new minarets. On the other hand, those who interacted with them on a regular basis did not go to the poll and remained indifferent to the issue. It is my opinion that the reaction of the majority of the Swiss citizens was driven by fear, probably due to the global financial crisis, aggravated by the increasing immigration of highly skilled Germans as well as other domestic political and economic problems (Pfaff-Czarnecka, 2009).

Eurosceptic populism: Lost in Unity


In addition to the growing popular resentment against multiculturalism and diversity, there is also a growing resentment among populist segments of the European public against the discourse of unity, which is also promoted by European institutions as well as by scholars, politicians, local administrators and NGOs. Right-wing populist leaders have always tried to capitalise on anti-EU sentiment. Most recently, the perception that European leaders are failing to tackle a developing economic crisis is fuelling further hostility towards the European Union, both right and left. As will be shown shortly, for instance, the *Lega Nord* is a vocal opposition of Mario Monti's technocratic government in Italy, disparaging his ties with the European elite. Marine Le Pen is stoking up fear of the EU as part of her campaign for the French presidency. The Dutch Freedom Party has called for a return to the national currency, becoming the first political movement in the Eurozone with a large popular base to opt for withdrawal from the single currency. What is more dangerous is that a larger group of people, fearing the consequences of the economic crisis, may be sympathetic to Eurosceptic populism without being

⁸ For the data set of the surveys on Islamophobia see <http://pewresearch.org/>; <http://people-press.org/>; and for an elaborate analysis of these findings see <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/sep/18/islam.religion>. One could also visit the website of the Islamophobia Watch to follow the record of racist incidences in each country: <http://www.islamophobia-watch.com/islamophobia-watch/category/anti-muslim-violence> (entry date 16 August 2016).

committed supporters: the risk is that their grievances could be hijacked by populist movements.⁹ The 2016 Spring Global Attitudes Survey of the Pew Research Centre shows that many European citizens have lost faith in the European Union (Figure 2). In a number of member states, ratings for the EU are significantly lower than they were before the onset of financial crisis (PEW, 2016).

After short-lived rebound, views of the EU are on the decline again in key European countries

Favorable view of EU



Source: Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey.

PEW RESEARCH CENTER

Figure 2. Views of the EU (Source: PEW 2016 Spring Global Attitudes Survey)

Populist parties in many member states of the EU are known for their Eurosceptic positions, especially extreme right-wing parties. Their Euroscepticism has become even stronger after the global financial crisis, which has afflicted the EU since 2008. Accordingly, in their edited volume, Kriesi and Pappas (2015) reveal that the recession led to a growing public support for the populist parties. Comparing the election results before and after the financial crisis they found that populism in Europe increased notably by 4.1 per cent. However, the support for populist parties shows remarkable differences from region to region. The populist surge has been very strong in Southern and Central-Eastern Europe with a rather anti-systemic content. Nordic populism is also on the rise, but it has a rather systemic nature, and populist parties including Sweden's Democrats and True Finns Party are even supportive of their competitors' policies. In Western Europe too populism was bolstered by the financial crisis. With a very strong Eurosceptic content, France and the UK experienced a sharp increase in public support for right-wing populism (Kriesi and Pappas, 2015: 323). In Germany, however, extreme right-wing populism also increased, but the main reason for this increase is the refugee crisis.

Geographical mobility of Europeans in times of global financial crisis

Global financial crisis has brought about various demographic changes in the EU leading to the migration of skilled or unskilled young populations from the South to the North and from the East to the West. Germany, the UK, Sweden are certainly the net winners of the current demographic change. However, the changes in the demographic structure of the EU do not only create problems for the migrant-sending EU countries, but also for the receiving countries. For instance, high-skilled German citizens cannot compete with the cheap skilled labour recruited from Spain, Italy, or Greece. Hence, they also find the solution of migrating to another country such as Switzerland, Austria, the USA and Great Britain (Verwiebe et al., 2010). On the other hand, relatively poorer countries of the East and South such as Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland cannot compete with the rich West to retain their skills and young generations, the loss of which causes societal discomfort. The

⁹ See the post by Marley Morris: "European leaders must be wary of rising Eurosceptic populism from both the right and the left" on the blog "Europop" - European politics and policy, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 26 March 2012.

increase in migration flows in the EU has been accompanied by an increase in the migrants' education level.¹⁰ According to a recent study, the percentage of intra-EMU migrants that were highly educated rose from 34 to 41 between 2005 and 2012 (Jauer et al., 2014). Emigrants from the southern periphery in particular show higher educational achievement and skill levels.¹¹ Highly educated migrants from the GIPS (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) moving to other euro member countries went from 24 per cent of the total in 2005 to 41 per cent in 2012. Among the total of these migrants who found employment, the percentage of highly skilled rose from 27 to 49. Regarding east-west migration, the same research found that the average emigrant from the EU-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) has tended to be less educated than his or her European counterparts – although being highly educated from these two countries increases the likelihood of emigration compared to those that are not. Highly educated emigrants from these two countries who moved between 2011 and 2012 accounted for 24 per cent of the total emigrants. Accordingly, the countries of destination have experienced an increase in the immigration of skills. Germany is the leading country in the EU attracting most of the highly-skilled labour from the rest of the EU. In Germany, 29 per cent of all immigrants aged 20 to 65 who arrived in the last decade or so (2001 to 2011) held a graduate degree, while among the total population the respective figure was only 19 per cent in 2011. Among the immigrants, more than 10 per cent had a degree in science, IT, mathematics or engineering, compared to 6 per cent among the rest of the population aged 25 to 65.

The changes in the magnitude and direction of migration flows reflect the changes in macroeconomic conditions in the EU. Emigrants often prefer to choose pre-existing paths where fellow country(wo)men have already settled down.¹² Due to such network effects migration often increases only slowly at first and then intensifies when it has reached a critical figure. Language also influences emigrants' choice of a destination country. This factor is important for skilled workers searching for an adequate job abroad. Thus, language skills might have gained in importance. In contrast, geographic proximity has lost relevance. The temporary restrictions on labour migration within the EU have also led to distortions. Most major forces, namely immigration rules, language and network effects have benefited the UK in the past decade. According to a study for the European Commission, about 90 per cent of inward migration from the EU-8 (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) to the UK in the years 2004 to 2009 is due to the EU enlargement, while in Germany only 10 per cent of total immigration during this period can be attributed to this event (Holland et al., 2011).

In the past few years, however, intra-EU migration and intra-eurozone migration have largely been driven by the economy. In the GIIPS (GIPS + Italy), decreasing immigration and surging emigration are clearly related to the deterioration in the labour markets there. It is also not a coincidence that Germany has become the leading destination country in the EU. Given the ongoing expansion in employment and the low unemployment rate – as of May 2014 it was 5.1 per cent – Germany has become more and more attractive for jobseekers from the GIIPS. As crisis-triggered migration was initially clearly dominated by EU-8 and EU-2 nationals, doubts have emerged about the willingness to migration of citizens from the old member countries. However, it is hardly surprising that foreign workers are more mobile and more prepared to leave their host country again when they become unemployed due to a labour market shock. Furthermore, the crisis in the GIIPS has especially hit sectors like construction, retail, and the

¹⁰ The average population with a tertiary education rose from 19.5 per cent in 2004 to 24.7 per cent in 2013. Among the peripheral countries, Portugal has seen the largest increase in the number of graduates, rising 59 per cent in the last decade, followed by Ireland and Italy at 44 per cent and 43 per cent, respectively.

¹¹ Deutsche Bank Research, 'The Dynamics of Migration in the Euro area,'
https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD000000000338137/The+dynamics+of+migration+in+the+euro+area.PDF

¹² For a detailed discussion on the Network Theory in migration studies see Thomas and Znaniecki (1918), Castells and Cardoso (2005), and King (2012).

hotel and restaurant industry, which used to employ many migrants from eastern EU and non-EU countries. In the past two years more and more nationals have joined the line away from the GIIPS. It is obvious that the economic situation has markedly influenced and altered migration patterns in the eurozone. Recently, young skilled Italians are heading towards Germany while their Spanish fellows are becoming less likely to leave their homeland.

	Young people born in the reporting country	Young people born in a foreign country	Of which	
			Young people born in an EU-28 country (except reporting country)	Young people born in a non-EU-28 country
EU-28	15.0	25.0	20.9	26.8
BE	13.0	27.0	19.7	31.7
BG	25.8	.(u)	.(u)	.(u)
CZ	12.8 ^(b)	12.6 ^(b)	9.9 ^(bu)	15.3 ^(b)
DK	7.1	10.5	8.3 ^(u)	11.6
DE	7.5	.	.	.
EE	13.8	27.3	.(u)	31.2 ^(u)
IE	18.7	18.0	19.6	15.1
EL	27.0	43.8	39.9	44.6
ES	20.0	33.9	34.0	33.8
FR	12.7 ^(b)	26.3 ^(b)	16.8 ^(b)	28.6 ^(b)
HR	21.4	37.0	28.8 ^(u)	39.2
IT	24.6	35.7	35.2	35.9
CY	19.7	22.7	25.4	19.9
LV	15.4	.(u)	.(u)	.(u)
LT	13.7	.(u)	.	.(u)
LU	5.3	10.7	8.7	17.4
HU	18.3	27.4	25.8	.(u)
MT	10.7	23.4	.(u)	20.1 ^(u)
NL	6.2 ^(b)	15.6 ^(b)	12.0 ^(b)	16.7 ^(b)
AT	6.9	18.5	13.0	22.2
PL	16.2 ^(b)	.(bu)	.(bu)	.(bu)
PT	16.3	18.5	.(u)	20.0
RO	19.6	.(u)	.	.(u)
SI	11.9	31.0	27.7 ^(u)	31.6
SK	19.0	.(u)	.(u)	.(u)
FI	10.5	17.7	13.5 ^(u)	19.8
SE	7.0	12.2	9.4	12.7
UK	14.4	15.8	12.9	17.6

. = not available; b = break in time series; u = low reliability

Table 1. Young people (aged 15–29) neither in employment nor in education and training (NEET) by broad groups of country of birth, 2013.png (Source: Eurostat)

Table 1 shows the level of unemployment hitting the young generations without education and training (aged between 15 and 29) as of 2013. Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal perform extremely weakly in terms of the employment, education and training of young generations. 27.0 per cent of Greek young people were unemployed, uneducated, and/or trained in 2013, as were 24.6 per cent of the Italian young people shared the same destiny.




Figure 3. Young people (aged 15–29) not in employment, education or training (NEET) by groups of country of birth, EU-28, 2007 (Source: Eurostat)

Figure 3 shows the level of unemployment and uneducation in accordance with the origin of young people (again, aged 15-29) residing in the European countries. Accordingly, young generations originating from non-EU countries are the most disadvantaged ones in terms of their level of employment, education and occupational training.

	Young people born in the reporting country	Young people born in a foreign country	Of which	
			Young people born in an EU-28 country (except reporting country)	Young people born in a non-EU-28 country
EU-28	28.3	44.0	32.2	49.3
BE	16.9	51.4	36.7	61.1
BG	48.4	;	;	;
CZ	17.0	24.3	20.8 ^(u)	27.6 ^(u)
DK	37.3	46.9	52.1 ^(u)	44.6
DE	25.1	35.2	29.3	38.6
EE	24.5	27.5 ^(u)	;	27.4 ^(u)
IE	39.6	41.3	32.9	65.5
EL	42.5	69.3	43.9 ^(u)	74.8
ES	30.9	50.9	40.5	53.7
FR	22.5	50.8	30.8 ^(u)	55.4
HR	29.3	51.1	19.0 ^(u)	56.7
IT	34.4	47.9	44.6	49.2
CY	25.6	41.9	34.2	49.8
LV	34.5	37.1 ^(u)	;	39.3 ^(u)
LT	33.3	35.5 ^(u)	;	;
LU	16.8	30.3	24.6	42.8
HU	37.4	24.5 ^(u)	;	;
MT	20.7	11.6	14.5 ^(u)	10.2 ^(u)
NL	17.4	45.3	17.8 ^(u)	49.8
AT	17.1	42.2	54.2	36.2
PL	27.0	;	;	;
PT	27.3	37.2	26.6	43.0
RO	44.5	;	;	;
SI	17.0	44.0	48.1 ^(u)	43.6
SK	20.2	;	;	;
FI	21.7	43.7	44.4 ^(u)	43.3
SE	21.7	43.5	39.8	44.2
UK	28.7	34.9	19.6	44.9

;- not available; b = break in time series; u = low reliability

Table 2. At-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate of young people (aged 16–29), by groups of country of birth, 2012.png (Source: Eurostat)

Table 2 also shows the risk of poverty among the young people aged between 16 and 19. Bulgaria (48 per cent), Romania (44.5 per cent), Greece (42.5 per cent), Ireland (39.6 per cent), Hungary (37.4), Italy (34.4 per cent) and Spain (31 per cent) are top of the list. The second column of the table shows that foreign-origin young people residing in these countries are in an even more difficult situation as far as their level of poverty is concerned. Growing poverty and unemployment prompt the young generations of these countries, especially those highly-skilled ones, to immigrate to Germany, UK or elsewhere in the world such as the USA, Canada and Australia.

	Young people born in the reporting country	Young people born in a foreign country	Of which	
			Young people born in an EU-28 country (except reporting country)	Young people born in a non-EU-28 country
EU-28	11.2	18.5	7.8	20.5
BE	4.9	23.6	11.8	36.3
BG	42.9	;	;	;
CZ	7.3	6.7	11.9 ^(u)	2.0 ^(u)
DK	5.8	6.1	;	8.7
DE	4.7	5.9	5.2	6.4
EE	9.2	14.6 ^(u)	;	16.2 ^(u)
IE	13.4	11.6	8.5	20.9
EL	23.4	55.3	39.1 ^(u)	58.8
ES	5.2	18.6	5.9	22.0
FR	6.7	16.2	3.1 ^(u)	19.2
HR	14.7	22.0	2.3 ^(u)	25.4
IT	15.1	26.7	17.9	30.4
CY	19.2	19.7	14.4	25.1
LV	23.9	10.4 ^(u)	;	9.9 ^(u)
LT	20.3	16.2 ^(u)	;	;
LU	1.8	1.3	1.7	0.5
HU	29.6	24.5 ^(u)	;	;
MT	9.9	4.1	5.2 ^(u)	3.5 ^(u)
NL	1.5	10.7	;	12.4
AT	2.7	13.4	4.2	17.9
PL	13.0	;	;	;
PT	8.3	17.4	5.0	24.2
RO	31.9	;	;	;
SI	6.5	14.5	;	15.8
SK	10.8	;	;	;
FI	4.2	5.9	10.3 ^(u)	3.9
SE	0.9	5.3	0.9	6.2
UK	11.9	13.2	4.9	18.7

;- not available; b = break in time series; u = low reliability

Table 3. Severe material deprivation rate of young people (aged 16–29), by groups of country of birth, 2012.png (Source: Eurostat)

Material deprivation among the European young people is also another source of the quest for a better life elsewhere. Bulgarian, Hungarian, Romanian, Greek, Lithuanian, Latvian, Cypriot and Italian young people are materially the most deprived in the EU (Table 3).

Such a demographic change within the EU is feeding into the fears of the local populations in different ways. Sometimes, the citizens of the receiving countries such as Germany may resent the growing

mobility of EU citizens by holding onto their nativist aspirations, as they may not appreciate the fact that their habitats are becoming more and more diversified, or somehow they may find it difficult to compete with recruited cheap labour in the labour market. In the case of migrant sending countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece or Portugal, their inhabitants may find it very challenging to cope with the fact that the rich North, or West, is impossible to compete with regard to the free mobility of skills. In both cases, it seems that what is more likely to be blamed is either globalization or Europeanization, or super-diversity.

There are some quantitative data with regard to the positive correlation between the fear of globalisation and the fear of European integration. According to the quantitative survey of the Bertelsmann Foundation conducted with a sample of 14,936 people in the EU-28 in August 2016, those who fear globalization are more likely to support leaving the European Union (47 per cent) in a referendum, only 9 per cent trust the politicians in their country, and 38 per cent are satisfied with how democracy is working in their country. Moreover, 57 per cent of people who are fearful of globalisation think that there are too many foreigners in their country, but only 29 per cent oppose gay marriage and 34 per cent think climate change is a joke (de Vries and Hoffmann, 2016).

Colonial Legacy: From Racism to Nativism

Colonialism was based on the systematic exclusion of the colonized. Hence, the notion of the people in colonial contexts was exclusionary. Colonial projects tend to legitimize and institutionalize relations of exploitation through the construction of racial hierarchies of difference, which justify and maintain the colonial agenda even in the post-colonial settings (Filc, 2015). To this effect, racism became an inherent element of colonialism to establish and perpetuate economic, cultural and social inequalities. Research shows that the regimes of truth established by the European colonialists in their colonies are likely to be reproduced and perpetuated in Europe as some of the colonized subjects had to move to Europe in the aftermath of the World War II as migrant labour. In this study, one of the premises is that European populism has some elements originating from the colonial past. This is why European populism differs from the Latin American form of populism. According to Dani Filc (2015), European populism is exclusionary, while the Latin American populism is inclusive. This difference between the two is based on the fact that the former was the colonizer while the latter was the colonized. It seems that the legacy of being the colonizer and being the colonized is still effective in moulding the content of populism in both settings.

In the last three decades or so, it is likely that western European experience of migration has been very productive in terms of creating both cohesive societies and exclusionary ones. In times of economic crisis, exclusionary acts of the states and majority societies often become more visible. Racism, xenophobia, and Islamophobia have been very common topics of discussion as far as migration, diversity and refugees were concerned. Now *nativism* has become a very popular kind of exclusionary discourse, promoted by populist politicians. Western Europe started to host many Muslim-origin immigrants following the World War II, who mostly originate from their former colonies such as the Maghrebian countries, India, and Pakistan. The increasing visibility of Muslim-origin immigrants in the public sphere after the mid-1970s has also carried the politics of racism, previously hidden in institutional and administrative levels, into the public domain. Then, those immigrants who were being blocked out of and refused an identity and identification within the majority nation, be it British, German, French, Belgian and Dutch, 'had to find some other roots on which to stand' (Hall, 1991: 52). Thus, being blocked out of any access to a British, German, French, Belgian or Dutch civic identity, immigrants and their children had to try to discover who they were (Hall, 1991: 52). In the aftermath of the transmission of the politics of racism into the public realm, they were forced to discover where they

came from, their lost languages, histories and cultures. As their histories were not in any books, they had to recover their roots with imagination. Hence, the young generations, or the grandsons of immigrants, as Ernest Gellner once said in relation to the American context, busied themselves trying to remember what the elder generations had tried to forget:

The famous Three generations law governing the behaviour of immigrants into America – the grandson tries to remember what the son tried to forget – now operates in many parts of the world on populations that have not migrated at all: the son, who arduously acquires a new idiom at school, has no desire to play at being a tribesman, but his son in turn, securely urbanised, may do so (Gellner, 1964: 164).

Here, it is evident that the newly constructed ethnicities and religiosities are highly different from the previous form of ethno-cultural and religious identities, which were basically built upon kinship, culture, tradition and folklore. New ethnicities and religiosities are, on the contrary, constructed in a dialogical and dialectical process identified by the form of interaction between receiving society and immigrants. To put it differently, the escalation of new ethnicities, new religiosities and new racisms is intertwined, and they are all the symptoms of the unresolved encounter between the majority societies and ethno-cultural and religious minorities in the public sphere.

There is no doubt that institutional racism and the societal reaction to the flow of immigration in the well-established European nation-states constitute the major landmarks of new racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Racial discrimination in the modern European states was left to market forces. It seems that immigrant-origin workers with low qualifications, who were recruited by the European states as the source of cheap labour in the 1960s, are no longer needed. Thus, states have recently tended to apply strict anti-immigrant laws that could be underlined as the prime evidence of the institutional racism (Sivanandan, 1990). Beside institutional racism, which appears in the administration, mass media, education, and judicial decision-making, some of the European states' governments have also put into force strict legal provisions to restrict the entry of immigrants and asylum seekers – a set of provisions that have been revisited during the Syrian refugee crisis. The implementation of those exclusionary legal provisions towards immigrants and asylum seekers, and the provocative political discourse of the governments at the expense of foreigners, also give momentum to the rise of xenophobic sentiments, such as the German Asylum Law (July 1, 1993) terminating economic asylum right and restricting the right of political asylum. The public speeches of politicians accusing the foreigners of unemployment and social depression are some of those acts, which legitimise xenophobia and racism in Germany, UK, France and elsewhere. The German Chancellor Helmut Kohl always explicitly rejected the fact that Germany was a country of immigration, even in the aftermath of tragic events of Mölln (1992) and Solingen (1993) leading to the murder of eight Turkish origin residents.¹³ Similarly, in one of her public speeches in the *Daily Mail* (January 31, 1978), Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher complained about the massive immigration of the New Commonwealth or Pakistani people to Britain, and explained her concerns about the 'occupation of England' by a different culture (Barker, 1981: 15). And, one of the former French Prime Ministers, Edith Cresson, once complained that 'of every ten immigrants found to be here [in France] illegally, only three are expelled' (Cited in Bhavnani, 1993). The common denominator of those speeches given by the high level politicians is the extensive usage of the terms like 'our people', 'our citizens' symbolising the 'victims', and 'immigrants' referring to the 'criminals' – a discourse which is the replicate of the former colonial discourse that had created a Manichean world view for the colonialist powers.

It is evident that there is a positive correlation between the exclusionary discourses of mainstream political elite and the rise of xenophobic climate, a correlation that has also prepared the ground of

¹³ See <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/04/world/thousands-of-germans-rally-for-the-slain-turks.html> accessed on 19 December 2016.

populist rhetoric in Europe. For instance, the climate of xenophobia, racism, and anti-Semitism in the former East Germany became arduous after the CDU-CSU came back to power in Germany in 2005. The former spokesperson of the defeated Social Democratic Party and Green coalition government (1998-2005), Uwe-Karsten Heye, shortly before the 2006 World Cup in Germany, declared that there were small and mid-size cities in Brandenburg and elsewhere where he would advise anybody of a different skin colour not to visit (Weinthal, 2006). A 37-year-old Black German was beaten into a coma on a street in Potsdam in the spring of 2006 by two men affiliated with the right-wing scene. The perpetrators blasted the victim as a 'pig' and a 'nigger'. The commissioner responsible for internal security in Potsdam, Jörg Schönbohm (CDU), refused to designate the attack as a race-based hate crime. Schönbohm's CDU colleague, Wolfgang Schäuble, the Interior Minister, commented that blond and blue-eyed people were also victims of acts of violence – an unfortunate discourse far from discouraging racist attacks (Mühe, 2007).

In this context, the question to be asked is about the nature of the current racism. Racism may be defined as a doctrine that divides the world into racial castes locked in an endless struggle for domination, in which the allegedly physically superior are destined to rule the allegedly inferior and form a racial elite. Racism is also defined as an ideology of the colonial period and of the period in which class struggles deepened. Racism, as an ideology, has been a form of manipulation formulated by state actors in order to be able to assist the creation of a 'collective spirit' against the 'others'; or it is a system of thoughts, which creates an underclass¹⁴ composed of the members of the other 'race'. Etienne Balibar (1991) conceives racism as an ideological apparatus of the state employed to provide national unity. Thus, 'racism is never simply a "relationship to the other" based upon a perversion of cultural and/or sociological difference; it is a relationship to the other mediated by the intervention of the state' (Balibar, 1991: 15).

In other words, racism, as Jacques Barzun (1965: xi) once argued, could be found in each theory or social project which aims to justify any kind of collective enmity. Because of the ideological manipulation of the state, society comes to terms with the clear-cut separation of 'we' versus 'foreigner' leading to a sort of Manichean nationalist imagination. This dualist representation of humanity effectively reduces what belongs to individuals to what belongs to groups, and naturalises all discrimination. Similarly, Pierre-Andre Taguieff (1988) defines two kinds of racism: 'discriminatory racism' and 'differential racism'. The former is 'normal' racism found in the discriminatory ideology of colonialism and modern slavery, as in Britain and France. It can be boiled down to two axioms: inequality (we are better) and universality (we are humanity). This implies two correlated attributes: the quality of universality for those who represent the 'we' and the racial quality (particularity) for those who stand for the 'others'. Those who define themselves as the representatives of the universal culture, blame others for belonging to an *uncivilised race* in denial of universality. In other words, discriminatory racism refers to oppression and exploitation applied by the bearers of the allegedly universal civilisation over indigenous peoples of colonies: *inclusionary racism* (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991: 39). The second type of racism implies the negation of the universal. While 'normal' racism results in colonialism and exploitation, both of which are legitimized by postulating the intellectual inferiority of those exploited, the second type is embodied in Nazism - an ideology predicated on the pre-eminence of difference and the elimination of the other, whose physical differences are sufficiently vague to generate

¹⁴ The term 'under-class' originally comes from a nineteenth-century Swedish word for lower class, *underclass*. Gunnar Myrdal (1963), a Swedish economist, was the first scholar who used the term to describe the victims of deindustrialization in a small book written for the American public. Myrdal defined the term as 'an unprivileged class of unemployed, unemployables and underemployed who are more and more hopelessly set apart from the nation at large and do not share in its life, its ambitions and its achievements (1963: 10). In his book, he foresaw that changes in the economy regarding the unemployed people forced out of the labor market. For a detailed analysis of the term 'underclass' see Gans (1995).

suspicion and fear of mixing. The goal of the *differential racism* is thus to annihilate the other by regarding him/her as the absolute enemy: *exclusionary racism* (Taguieff, 1988).

The main constituent of differential racism is the encounter of cultural differences and traditions, which have become manifest in the aftermath of the World War II. The increasing intersection of various cultures in the last decades has simultaneously brought about the rise of ethno-cultural and religious contradictions. The rise of the population of Pakistanis and Indians in the UK, Algerians in France, Turks in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, and Moroccans in Belgium is conceived by the Europeans as a major threat against the Judeo-Christian European civilisation. This is what we call 'new-racism'. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (1991: 21), in this context, define new-racism in a way that emphasises cultural differentiations:

The new racism is a racism of the era of 'decolonization', of the reversal of population movements between the old colonies and the old metropolises, and the division of humanity within a single political space. Ideologically, current racism, which in Germany centers upon the immigration complex, fits into a framework of 'racism without races' which is already widely developed in other countries, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon ones. It is a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation to others but only the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions; in short, it is what P.A. Taguieff has rightly called a *differentialist racism*.

Thus, 'new racism', regardless that of the ex-colonial states or of the non-colonial states, no more resembles the racism of the era of colonisation which carried an inclusionary discourse under the framework of 'strong' and 'weak' cultures. Rather, it has an exclusionary nature of a cultural differentialism as in the contemporary mode of 'differentialist racism', a '*racism-without-races*'. The 'new cultural racism', or in other words 'differentialist racism' is formed by the state in order to exclude what is threatening the existence of the nation-state. To sum up, the ideology of racism is often constructed as a tool for governmentality to exclude the threats directed against the nation-state; the threats could be either class struggle, or ethno-cultural and religious cleavages, as they are perceived now. Such forms of governmentality deployed by modern states conceal the structural sources of social and political inequality, and prompt individuals to become preoccupied with an ethno-cultural and religious discourse in raising their political claims. One needs to realise that such forms of ethno-culturalist discourse become popular along with the crisis of the welfare state, thus with the rise of neo-liberal understanding of prudentialism, making things harder for marginalized migrant origin communities.

It seems that contemporary Populism has made another term very popular: *nativism*. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, nativism is prejudice in favour of natives against strangers. Today, nativism means a policy that will protect and promote the interests of indigenous, or established inhabitants over those of immigrants. This usage has recently found favour among Brexiters, Trumpists, Le Penists and other right-wing populist groups, who seem to be anxious to distance themselves from accusations of racism, xenophobia and Islamophobia. Nativism sounds more neutral, and conceals all the negative connotations of race, racism, Islamophobia and immigration (Jack, 2016). Hence, the nativist European populism is now claiming to set the true, organic, rooted and local people against the cosmopolitan, globalizing elites denouncing the political system's betrayal of ethno-cultural and territorial identities (Filc, 2015: 274). Now in what follows, a detailed analysis of the six countries under scrutiny will be made in relation to their experiences with the populist movements and political parties from both right and left of the political spectrum.

Conclusion

The purpose of this essay was to reveal the social-economic drivers of the contemporary forms of populist movements in Europe. It is often presumed that the affiliates of such populist movements and parties are political protestors, single-issue voters, 'losers of globalization', or ethno-nationalists. However, the picture seems to be more complex. Populist party voters are dissatisfied with, and distrustful of, mainstream elites, and most importantly they are hostile to immigration and rising ethno-cultural and religious diversity, which are perceived to be the symptoms of globalization. While these citizens are feeling themselves economically insecure, their hostility springs mainly from their belief that immigrants and minority groups are threatening their national culture, social security, community and way of life. They are perceived by the followers of the populist parties as a security challenge threatening social, political, cultural and economic unity and homogeneity of their nation. The main concern of these citizens is not just the ongoing immigration and the refugee crisis; they are also profoundly anxious about a minority group that is already settled: Muslims. Anti-Muslim sentiment has become an important driver of support for populist extremists. This means that appealing only to concerns over immigration such as calling for immigration numbers to be reduced or border controls to be tightened, is not enough. The resentment against the symptoms of globalization seems to be one of the two essential drivers of populism leading to the feelings of getting *lost in diversity* among the followers of such political parties.

A second constituent of the contemporary forms of populist rhetoric is the growing resentment against the European Union, which is perceived by the affiliates of populism as one of the sources of the current political and economic crisis. In such a period of structural, political and economic crisis triggered by the ongoing refugee crisis and escalating waves of terrorism, a growing number of European citizens, mostly lower-educated, male in 30-50 age-bracket, rural, and unemployed segments of the European public, are likely to become more affiliated with nationalism, localism, and Euroscepticism. The transnational character of the European Union has recently become one of the main focal points of criticism for the populist political leaders, who happen to invest in the capitalization of the feelings of getting *lost in unity*.

It was also argued that populist political style has become very widespread together with the rise of neo-liberal forms of governmentality capitalizing on what is cultural, ethnic, religious and civilizational. The supremacy of cultural-religious discourse in the West is likely to frame many of the social, political, and economic conflicts within the range of societies' religious differences. Many of the ills faced by migrants and their descendants, such as poverty, exclusion, unemployment, illiteracy, lack of political participation, and unwillingness to integrate, are attributed to their Islamic background, believed stereotypically to clash with Western secular norms and values. Accordingly, this essay has just argued that 'Islamophobia' is a key ideological form in which social and political contradictions of the neoliberal age are dealt with, and that this form of culturalization is embedded in migration-related inequalities as well as geopolitical orders. Culturalization of political, social, and economic conflicts has become a popular sport in a way that reduces all sorts of structural problems to cultural and religious factors – a simple way of knowing what is going on in the World for the individuals appealed to by populist rhetoric.

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